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ABSTRACT:
This dissertation deals with restraints in post-employment cases in England, South Africa and
Germany. The attempt was made to compare the restraint of trade doctrine that was developed
in England and is still used in the common law countries, on one the hand, and the German
restraint of trade rules on the other.
Therefore the development of the restraint of trade doctrine in England is described, as well as
the modifications of the restraint of trade doctrine in South Africa. Also it is given an overview
of the German restraint of trade rules.
As far as the English and South African law is concerned, the historical developments and
applicable principles of the restraint of trade doctrine are emphasised, whereas the main aim in
the German part is to give an overview about the codified restraint of trade rules.
While comparing the common law doctrine and the German restraint of trade law it is
emphasised that in the common law countries the reasonableness and public interest plays an
important role, whereas in German restraint of trade law, on the other hand, the payment of
compensation is an important matter.
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COMPARISON OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, ENGLAND AND
GERMANY:
PREFACE
Throughout the world one finds restraints of trade. In some countries a codified body of law
regulates different restraints, in others ancient principles and judgements achieve this.
In the common law system you have to deal with the "restraint of trade doctrine" that has been
developed over the past few centuries.
Due to this doctrine contracts concerning labour law can be subject to these restraint rules. In
particular restraints during an employment, after an employment and in anti-poaching cases have
to comply with this doctrine. The doctrine applies also to restraints of trade where land is leased
out or in cases of sale of business. In cases like the George Michel case! the doctrine is also
applicable, where an artist is restrained.
Whereas Germany is a country where the law basically is codified, and therefore the restraint of
trades rules are laid down in different acts. A general rule covering the whole range of topics, like
the restraint of trade doctrine does, has never existed in Germany. Rather the principle of
restraint of trade law appears in many different statutes.
For instance the law of restraints during employment is laid down as a basic rule in the Civil
Code. The law of post-employment restraints for commercial agents and commercial employees
is laid down in the Commercial Code. To solus agreements sec. 242 Civil Code is applicable. Anti
poaching contracts are void due to sec. 611, 138, 242 Civil Code.
The scope of this dissertation is to present on the one hand an overview of the English and
South African restraint of trade doctrine as examples of common law jurisdictions, and on the
other hand an overview of the German restraint of trade rules.
Furthermore the focus of this dissertation is on the post-employment restraints in these three
countries. The main aim is to describe the fundamental and structural similarities and differences
of the three legal systems.
Unfortunately many interesting topics have to be left out, like anti-poaching contracts, as well as
remedies in all three legal systems or the restraint of trade law of commercial agents in the
German system.
Despite this limitation, an attempt has been made to compare most of the different aspects of
restraint of trade occurring in the context of employment in the different countries.
1 Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment Ltd [1994)EMLR 229.
1
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
PART I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE IN THE COMMON
LAW SYSTEM
The modern Restraint of Trade Doctrine was mainly developed, and the main principles settled
in a number of major cases at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.ê
However, the roots of the doctrine went much deeper.'
1. DEVELOPMENT DURING MEDIEVAL TIMES:
Though the modern doctrine operates mainly in the area of negotiated contracts, it was
formed partly as a result of the law's response to three other problems during medieval times.
They were firstly, the attempts of private individuals to make a profit by interfering with food
supplies, secondly, the attempt of guilds to regulate the economic affairs of their members and
thirdly, grants of monopolies by the Crown. These problems raise different issues; and public
opinion has not been unchanging with regard to them. However, until the late sixteenth
century the common law was not much concerned with those issues."
1.1.INTERFERENCE WITH FOOD SUPPLIES
During medieval times salesmen tried to dominate parts of the "food markets". As a
result many medieval statutes were enacted to prevent private individuals having exclusive
control over the price of goods, particularly food.> In 1552 the most elaborate of these
statutes defined the criminal offences of forestalling, regrating and engrossing in detail.
These offences all have in common that the goods were purchased by middlemen before
they reached the retail markets so that the retail price was artificially increased. In the late
eighteenth century the Act was repealed. Nevertheless some of the underlying general
policies are the same and they made little particular contribution to the development of
the modern restraint of trade doctrine.?
1.2. POWER OF THE GUILDS
More important was the activity of the guilds in those times. During medieval times two
principal kinds of guilds existed. Firstly, freemen formed associations in towns with
exclusive rights of trading within them. The second was an association of persons
exercising the same trade. Both kinds of guilds have in common that they existed to
protect their members' interests. They developed statutes to regulate their markets. In the
main, that led to a reduction of competition of members with one another and, by
repressing competition from "outside-traders", with people who did not belong to that
2 Nordenfeldt v Maxim Nordenfeldt Guns and Arrununition Co, [1894] AC 535; Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co, (1913] AC 724;
Herbert Mortis Ltd v Saxelby, (1916] 1 AC 688.
J The histo:y is discussed in: JD Heydon, "The Restraint of Trade Doctrine" (1999) 1 - 27, Anon., "Of Contracts Operating in Restraint of
Trade" (183/), 21 Law Magazine 306; JM Kerr, "Contracts in Restraint of Trade" (1888), 22 Am. L.R. 873; Sanderson, Restraint of Trade in
English taw (1926) 7 - 47,94 - 9.
4 JD Heydon, op cit p 2.
5 Cf. RO Wilberforce, A Campbell and NElles, "The Law of Resttictive Trade Practices and Monopolies" (1966) paras. 115-24.
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particular town or guild. The great power of guilds stemmed from their right to demand
that only guildmen could trade, and from the fact that the entry to the guilds was
regulated by the gilds themselves." The first important restrictions of the power of the
guilds came at the end of the sixteenth century.
For instance in Davenant v. Hurdis (The Merchant Tailor's Case) the King's Bench had to
consider the validity of a by-law made by the Merchant Tailors' guild in an attempt to
strengthen its position against the Clothworkers' Guild, requiring members who put out
cloth to be finished by outside labour to have an equal amount fInished by other
members. The by-law was held void as tending a monopoly: "a rule of such nature as to
bring all trade or traffic into the hands of one company, or one person, and to exclude all
others, is illegal"." Within the following years some other cases had to be judged, like the
Gowf::y v. KnightlO or Ipswich Tailors' Case,11 where similar rules were declared void and
brought all sorts of repressive restrictions and manorial customs to an end. The law of
guilds then stood like this until the law of restraint of trade was reviewed in the early
eighteen century in the important case of Mitchel v. Rrynolds.12
1.3. ROYAL GRANTS OF MONOPOLIES
Medieval kings commonly made grants of monopolies for particular purposes; indeed in
the sixteenth century the technical meaning of monopoly was generally limited to royal
grants. One type of royal monopoly grant was to guilds, which made by-laws in restraint
of trade by royal authority. Another type of monopoly grant purported to protect
inventors of new manufacturing processes in the same way as the modern patent. These
were introduced into England from Italy in the later seventeenth century, and were used
by the Crown to raise revenue without Parliamentary sanction and without regard as to
whether a genuine invention had in fact been made.l- Later these grants were rejected and
in Darry v. .Allen" the grant was held void as against various statutes, but more
importantly, as contrary to common law.
2. CONTRACTUAL RESTRAINTS BEFORE MITCHEL V. REYNOLDS
The earliest reported case concerning a contractual restraint of trade is the Dyer's Case.15 The
defendant entered a bond not to practice the trade of dyer in a certain town for half a year. He
pleaded no breach, and won on this point. But HULL], also said that he could have demurred
6 JD Heydon, op cit p 3.
71bid.
8 (1598) Moore, KB 576.
9 Ibid, P 59!.
IOJI60lj' Nay 183.II 1614, II Co Rep 53.
121711,IPWms181.
13 D Heydon, op cit pp 5-6.
14(1602) II Co Rep 84.
IS2 Hen 5, f 5, p126 (1414).
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as the bond was illegal; "By God, if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he paid
a fine to the King." It is still unclear what made HULL J make this severe statement. It is
suggested that restraints in bonds were intrinsically more oppressive than in other contracts
and were more likely to be struck down. Another suggestion is that Dyer's Case does not
depend on "any special vice in the bond [but reflects a general] medieval view [... ] that any
restraint upon the freedom of a man to carry on his trade or profession was completely
void."16 The key to this case seems to lie in the great hardship involved.!? but on the other
hand side restraints were also held valid, e.g. in Rogers v. Petrey, 18 where the defendant
promised the plaintiff, his landlord, that he would not practice his trade of joiner in a shop
leased to him for twenty-one years.
3. MITCHEL V. REYNOLDS
As mentioned above, cases before Mitchel v. Rryno/ds were dominated by political upheaval and
personal hardship. Compared with this, Mitchel v. Rryno/ds made matters clearer.
The defendant had assigned the lease of a bakehouse to the plaintiff for five years, and gave a
bond undertaking to pay a penalty if he worked as a baker during that term. The court found
for the plaintiff because there was "a special consideration [... ] set forth in the condition,
which shows it was reasonable for the parties to enter into it";'? but the actual decision is less
important than PARKER CJ's masterly review20 of trade restraints, whether imposed by
contract, royal charter, custom, or by-law, in his attempt to "reconcile the jarring opinions'V!
PARKER CJ dogmatically pointed out the existence of two kinds of restraints; firstly
involuntary and secondly voluntary restraints.
3.1. INVOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS
The involuntary restraint can be split up into three further categories. The first comprised
those depending on grants or charters from the Crown. These were generally
void.ê-except grants to a guild of exclusive rights of admission to a trade,23 and some
others.ê" The second category depended on customs: "All customs that restrain liberty of
trade, must be clear and plain, and not doubtful".2s Lastly, the third class of involuntary
restraints comprised those stemming from a by-law. These were valid if supported by a
reasonable custom to the same effect, of if made to restrain trade, in order to the better
government and regulation of it.26
16 JDHeydon,opcitp7.
17asPARKERCJ statedin Mitchel v. Rey"oids.
1811614),2Bulst136.191711),lPWms182.
20DHeydon,opcitp9.
21bid.
22Darcyv Allen(1602),11CoRep84b.
23Nornsv Staps(1616),Hob210.
24Cf.JD Heydon,opcitp9.
25ColchesterCorporationv Goodwin(1667),Carter68,114.
26(1711),1PWms181,184.
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In summary PARKERCJ laid down a simple rule: "General restraints are all void, whether
by bond, covenant or promise, ... , with or without consideration, and whether it be of the
party's own trade, or not ... Particular restraints ... without consideration ... are void by
what sort of restraint soever created ... Where a contract for restraint of trade appears to
be made upon a good and adequate consideration, so as to make it a proper and useful
contract, it is good".27
3.2. VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS
According to PARKERCJ voluntary restraints must have a different basis from involuntary
restraints. Therefore he stated that the true reasons why the law frowned on voluntary
restraints were as follows: First, a contract of restraint of trade causes the covenantee to
lose his livelihood and brings suffering to his family. Secondly, it deprives the public of a
useful worker. Thirdly, such contracts can be abused to give covenantees unfair
advantages like masters trying to protect themselves from future competition from their
apprentices.
On the other hand, the law frequently upholds restraints which are "useful and beneficial,
as to prevent a town from being overstocked with any particular trade".z8
Lastly, PARKER CJ pointed out that the public interest was not affected m Mitchel v.
Reynolds. The only issue was whether the plaintiff or the defendant should be the local
baker; in any event there would be a baker. Furthermore the contract was reasonable
particularly because the restraint was "exactly proportioned to the consideration, viZ. the
term of five years".Z9
4. THE LATER DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
"There is very little in the modern approach to the problem for which a basis cannot be
found" in PARKERCrs opinion.Pbut some points of principle were left obscure by him;'! and
some more detailed principles have been developed, mainly during the early nineteenth
century, when a flood of litigation had to be judged.
4.1. REASONABLENESS
The restraint of trade doctrine arose for consideration mainly in connexion with three
kinds of contracts. Restraints were reasonable if they protected the goodwill of a business
after its sale. Such a restraint was validated in Mitchel v. Rrynolds,32 though problems arose
in courts of equity.33 Secondly, contracts were reasonable if they did no more than
27 (1711), 1 P Wms 181, 185-6.
28 j P Wms 181, 191.
29 Ibid, P 197.
30 Blake, "Employee Agreements not to Compete" (1960), 73 Harv LR 625, 630-1.
31 JD Heydon, op cit p 13.
32 (1711), 1 P Wms 181.
33 Cf. JÓ Heydon, op cit pIS.
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prevent an employee from competing against his employer during or after the
employrnent.é" Thirdly, contracts were reasonable if they prevented a partner from
competing against the partnership during or after it.35
But also another issue that was settled during the nineteenth century was that the courts
would not investigate the adequacy of the consideration provided for a restraint, as they
had had to do before. Some courts began to question the restraints utility because of the
difficulty of determining adequacy= and in Hitchcock v. Coker37 a new approach was
adopted by TINDALCJ, in the court of Exchequer Chamber, revising the Court of King's
Bench. The question is not "whether the consideration is equal in value to that which the
party gives up or loses by the restraint under which he has placed himself ... ".38 The true
test is whether "the restraint of a party from carrying on a trade is larger and wider than
the protection which the party with whom the contract is made, can possibly require.'?
Furthermore, during the nineteenth century the distinction between "general" restraints
(over the whole kingdom) and "partial" restraints (over a narrower place) was discussed.
It was argued that general restraints should not be held bad per se, but only if
unreasonable. This culminated in the famous Nordetifelt v. Maxim Nordenfeit Guns and
Ammunition Co., Ltd Case.t" where the defendant sold his world-wide armaments business
and agreed not to compete anywhere in the world for twenty-five years, and it was held
reasonable by the Court of Appeal. This new approach was supported and later adopted
by the House of Lords.f and quickly became widely accepted: a contract in restraint of
trade was reasonable if it did no more than protect the interests of the covenantee. The
earlier test that had considered the adequacy of the compensation was thereafter no
longer applicable and the test was now firmly one of reasonableness.v
4.2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Though PARKERCJ, in Mitchel v. Reynolds stressed that the vice of unreasonable restraints
lay substantially in the damage they inflicted on the public interest; but this was little
considered by the later courts until the mid-nineteenth century.tê The public interest was,
for instance, considered in a case about an agreement by two coachowners to fix prices
and not to compete.v' or a market-sharing agreement between box makers.f But,
generally the public policy issues were judged restrictively and the contracts were upheld.
34 Chesman v. Nainby (1727). 2 Str 739.
3S Bryson v. Whitehead (1822), 1 Sim & St 74.
36 KepE_ell v. Bailey (1834), 2 My & K 517.
37 (183/), 6 Ad & E 438.
38 fbid 457
39 Ibid' 454'
40 f1893]1 Cho 630; on appeal, [1894] AC 535.
41 Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., Ltd.; [1913] AC 724; Herbert Morris, Ltd v Saxelby, [1916]1 AC 688.
42 Cf. JD Heydon, op cit p 18.
43 Cf. Ibid, P 19.
44 Hearn V. Grifftn (1815), 2 Chit 407.
45 Wickens v. Evans (1829),2 Y &J 318.
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The main reasons for those judgements was the political attitude that the state should
interfere as little as possible in the workings of the economy or, in other words, the
principle of freedom of trade was intensely uphold.
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PART II:THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE IN ENGLAND
In the Norde'!ftlt Case,46 the restraint of trade doctrine was developed to a stage, where it became
the basis for the "modern restraint of trade doctrine".
1. WHAT IS A RESTRAINT OF TRADE?
As mentioned in Part I, the restraint of trade doctrine was used in medieval times in a wide
range of topics; from anti-trust problems to general public policy issues. To examine and
compare the restraint of trade doctrine with other law systems, you have firstly to define the
scope of the modern doctrine. Normally you have to deal with three problems. First, is there a
restraint? Secondly, is it a restraint of trade? Thirdly, is it one of those restraints to which the
restraint of trade doctrine appliesr'" Only if all these answers are affirmatively answered, can
the reasonableness of the restraint be examined.
1.1.ls THERE A RESTRAINT?
To answer this first question several propositions were made. LORD DENNING MR, said
in Petroftna Ltd. v. Martin,48 "Every member of the community is entitled to carry on any
trade or business he chooses and in such a manner as he deems most desirable in his own
interests, so long as he does nothing unlawful: with the consequence that any contract
which interferes with the free exercise of his trade or business, by restricting him in the
work he may do for others, or the arrangements which he may make with others, is a
contract in restraint of trade." A more formal definition was used by DIPLOCK LJ49 in the
same case, which was approved by LORD HODSON in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's
Garage Ltd. 50: "A contract in restraint of trade is one in which a party (the covenantor)
agrees with any other party (the covenantee) to restrict his liberty in the future to carry on
trade with other persons not parties to the contract in such manner as he chooses."
The tests have three particular elements in common: First, a restrained person must be
bound by the future, and with respect of third parties. Secondly, ordinary contracts of sale
are excluded, and thirdly, agreements to serve the covenantee exclusively for a future
period fall within these definitions. 51
1.2. WHAT IS A RESTRAINT OF TRADE?
Over time the courts developed some classical types of restraints, as in post-employment
cases, post-partnership cases, anti-poaching contracts, etc. but in some cases the question
arises, if as to whether the restraint is one that restrains someone from trading with
something, and therefore the restraint of trade doctrine can be applied. Courts have not
46 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co, Ltd (1894] AC 535.
47 JD Heydon, op cit p 42.
48 ~1966lCh 146, 169.
49 1966 Ch 146, 180.
50 1968 AC 269, 317.
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often dealt with this topics, but in one case52 the validity of an agreement between the
seller and the first-hand buyer of a car not to resell it within a certain time was considered.
Lords Russel and Keith considered that the agreement restrained the trade of a second
hand car dealer, so that the doctrine applied even though they were not parties to the
contract.
1.3. Is THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE APPLICABLE?
Before investigating the reasonableness of the restraint one has to decide whether the
restraint is of the kind to which the restraint of trade doctrine applies. If not, the contract
is enforceable and the reasonableness of the restraint has not to be considered.
Therefore, Sutherland PJ53 proposes, the courts should ask whether there is a clause that
can be said to interfere with the principles underlying the doctrine, and they should
thereafter determine whether the doctrine should apply to such a contract in the light of
the particular contractual relationship of which it forms a part.
1.3.1. PROTECTED PRINCIPLES
In General, it can be stated that the aim of the doctrine is to protect the ability to
work, as an important public policy value, against infringement in cases where it
doesn't constitute a benefit to the community. Benefit, in this case, means that it
is economically necessary that certain interests are protected. In detail:
1.3.1.1. FREEDOM OF WORK
Freedom of work underlies the doctrine.>' Courts have often mentioned that the
interest to be protected is the right or ability to earn a livelihood through acquired
skills.ê>In addition the right to acquire further skills belongs as well to the core of
the freedom of work principle. The courts have emphasised society's entitlement
to the fruits of the work of persons who have the necessary skills.56 As well,
freedom to choose work is part of the freedom of work principleY Courts should
not only focus on direct negative contractual obligations that restrict a person
from working in certain areas; they should also consider the wider freedom of
work issues like contracts that tie the accrual of certain advantages, like the
payment of a pension or other privilege, to a condition or obligation prohibiting a
person from doing certain work, if the practical effect is also specific interference
with the freedom of work.58 Also a Scheme according to which the covenantor
~l Cf. JG Collinge, "The Modern Doctrine of Restraint of Trade" (1968), 41 A.L J 414.
,2 See the Amencan Restatement, Contracts para. 513 and comment.
53 PI Sutherland, "The restraint of trade doctrine in England, Scodand and South Africa" (1997) 52.
54 I6id,pp 31-2.
55 Dyer s Case (1414) YB 2 Hen 5 fo 5; cf PJ Sutherland op cit 35.
51> Ipswich Tailors Case, 11 Co Rep 53.
57 Cf. PJ Sutherland op cit 38-9.
58 Ibid, P 53.
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would be forced to restrict his freedom of work, or pay certain penaltiesv as weil
as positive obligations, if they cause the exclusion of other possibilitiesv have to
be judged as an encroachment of the freedom of work principle.
Furthermore, third party agreements can fail under the freedom of work principle,
as in the KoresCase'", where two companies agreed that they would not employ
each other's employees or in the Eastham Case62, where a footballer was directly
bound by contract to a club and agreed to obey certain restrictive rules when
leaving the club for another.
1.3.1.2. FREEDOMOFTRADE
Besides the freedom of work principle "freedom of trade" is often mentioned as
the basis of the restraint of trade doctrine and this is certainly acceptable.P
Nevertheless it is necessary to distinguish what is covered by the freedom of
trade, and what is not. There is no numerus clausus of particular transactions that
are protected by the doctrine, while others are not.
Courts, for instance, had to judge several cases concerning solus agreements in
the petrol industry. Garage owners commonly agree to take ail their supplies from
one petrol company, to operate the garage at certain times, and by the "continuity
covenant", to procure a similar agreement from assignees. In Petrofina Ltd v. Martin
BUCKLEYJ, held such an agreement to be an (unreasonable) restraint of trade. By
contrast, in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Harper's Garage Ltc/A MOCATTAJ, held that
restraint of trade doctrine did not apply to solus agreements relating to a
particular piece of land, but only to restraints on persons. But the Court of Appeal
rejected this view.
2. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION
The second step, after deciding if a certain contract falls within the restraint of trade doctrine,
is to determine whether the contract should be condemned for being in restraint of trade.
Different methodologies are currently being used for determining the effectiveness of the
classic restraints, i.e. post-employment, sale of goodwill, and post-partnership restraints on the
one hand, and ail the other types of restraints on the other.s> When determining the
reasonableness in classic restraints, one will see that there is a structured and more layered
reasonable tes t.66
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, P 54.
61 Kores Manufacturing Co Ltd v. Kalak Manufacturing Co Ltd [1959]1 Ch 108.
62 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413.
63 NordenfeIt v Maxim Nordenfeit Guns and Ammunition Co, Ltd [1894]AC 566, 567-8.
64 [1968]AC 269.
65 U. PJ Sutherland op cit p 60.
66 Ibid.
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In this dissertation the attention is tuned mainly on the structure of the substantive question,
as well as on the classic post-employment restraint.
2.1. NORDENFELT TEST
The current substantive test in England for determining the reasonableness of a restraint
is still the Nordenfelt test. The key statement was made by LORD MACNAGHTEN in
Nordetife/t.67 "It is a sufficient justification and indeed it is the only justification if the
restriction is reasonable - reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties
concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so
guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while
at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public". In essence the restraint must be
reasonable inter partes and reasonable in the interest of the public.
Nevertheless, it might be suggested that LORD PEARCE in Esso attempted to compress the
doctrine into one broader public interest test. He stated: "There is not, as some cases
seem to suggest, a separation between what is reasonable on the grounds of public policy
and what is reasonable as between the parties. There is one broad question: is it in the
interest of the community that this restraint should, as it is between the parties, be held to
be reasonable and enforceable?"
As Sutherland stated, the judge merely attempted to stress that the public policy underlies
both requirements. He did not attempt to fuse them into one test.68 Heydon suggested,
furthermore, that the reasonableness and public policy interest elements would still have
to distinguished because the onus would be different with regard to the two elements.s?
Because of all these arguments the reasonableness of the restraint has firstly to be judged
by the interest of the parties and secondly by the public interests.
3. POST-EMPLOYMENT COVENANTS
As described above, the interests have to be reasonable inter partes. The covenantee must do
no more than protect his interests with the restraint. Or more precisely: "The covenantee may
not in the widest sense, restrict someone where such a restriction exceeds any interest of
his."7oBut courts have also accepted that not all interests of the covenantee are protectabie.
Only legitimate interests can be subject to an effective restraint of trade.
3.1. LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS
In England courts have accepted that trade connections and trade secrets may be
protected, as legitimate interests in post-employment restraints."
67 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co, Ltd [1894]AC 565.
68 PI Sutherland op cit p 61.
69 JD Heydon, "Recent Developments in Restraint of Trade" (1975) 21 McGill LJ 325,343.
70 SV Nevanas & Co v Walker and Foreman [1914]1 Ch 413.
71 Cf. PJ Sutherland op cit p 77.
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3.1.1. TRADE CONNECTIONS
"Trade connections" is an extensive term for different kinds of economic
relations. Customer connections belong to the core of trade connections as well
as wider trade connections.F
3.1.1.1. CUSTOMER CONNECTIONS
Customer connections are connections between a customer and a particular
covenantee. Therefore every customer connection has a covenantee-related
element, because only a particular connection between a customer and an
employer's business can be protected. Such connections will only be protectable if
customers belong to the covenantee, with some exclusivity and continuity in the
relationship. Secondly, every customer connection has as well a covenantor-
related element. Customer connections will only exist relative to a particular
employee.
Covenantee-related requirements must, in particular, not be applied too strictly.
Employers need the protection of fragile customers. It was for instance stated/>
"When an employee has access to the customers of a business and is in a position
to build up a particular relationship with the result that when he leaves his
employer's service he could easily influence customers to follow him and trade
with him at the expense of his employer, there is no reason why, in principle, a
restraint should not be enforced to protect the employer's trade connections. The
onus being on the employee to prove the unreasonableness of the restraint, it is
for him to show that he never acquired any significant personal knowledge of or
influence over a person he dealt with". In other words courts will only refuse to
protect customer connections that were created and maintained by the aptitude
and skill of the employee alone.?" They are only protectable if the customers
belong to the employer. The covenantee can protect customer connections even
if the covenantor has contributed substantially towards their establishment. 75
The second covenantee-related requirement is, that a certain exclusivity and
recurrence of the relationship has to exist.76 It is controversial if a customer
connection is established only after the conclusion of recurring transactions with
the covenantee, or already after the first one. However, recurrence cannot be an
absolute requirement. A customer connection will also be established where only
72 PJ Sutherland op cit p 78.
73 Branco and Another T / A Mr Cool v. Gale (1996) 1 SA 163, 164.
74 Bowler v Lovegrove [19211 1 Ch 642, 652-3.
7S The reasons are given in Eastes v. Russ, [191411 Ch 468, 487, where an employee has been paid to assist in building up the connection.
76 Douglas Llambias Associates Ltd v Napier 11)90 GWD 39-2243.
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a singular transaction forms the basis of the relationship, if the single transaction
is fundamentally important and valuable over a period of time.
Furthermore, a customer connection is not protectable forever. A customer
connection can only be protected during a particular period if the customer would
have remained with the employer during the period of restraint but for the fact
that the employee had left the service of the covenantee.??
As mentioned above, every customer connection has a covenantor-related
element as well. Firstly, the customer connection has to exist to a particular
employee, so not every customer of the employer is protectable against every
single employee. Mere knowledge that the covenantor is an employee of a
business of which a particular person is a customer will not suffice. In other
words a protectable customer connection only exists, if the particular employee
has contact with the customers or influence over them because of the
employment which makes it possible to plunder them from his employer."
Further, there is no doubt, that also the employee's knowledge of customer's
personal affairs or requirements is protectable. It is only disputed if it is also
possible to protect it as a customer connection or only as trade secrets. Sutherland
Pj19 stated "knowledge probably cannot be protected under this rubric if no
relationship has been created. This knowledge [over customers] can help to show
that a protectable relationship or influence has developed between customer and
employee. It might show that influence over a customer has been gained, and the
customer might follow the employee when he leaves the employment of the
covenantee."
3.1.1.2. OTHER TRADE CONNECTIONS
Other trade connections besides the customer connections are connections that a
business has with organisations that allow it to have a competitive edge, and
which are important assets to the business, for instance a particular connection to
a supplier who grants exclusive privileges.
3.1.2. TRADE SECRETS
The knowledge of trade secrets and know-how can also justify a restraint of
trade.ê? A consistent distinction between trade secrets and know-how was not
developed. Rather you can say, "trade secrets" include "know-how".
77[ohn Michael Design pk v Cook r19871 2 All ER 332, 334-5.
78R.opeways Ltd v Hoyle (1919) 12() LT 538, 543.
79PJ Sutherland op eit p 87.
80The principle was established in Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby, [1916] 1 AC 711-12.
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It is generally accepted that trade secrets can justify a post-employment restraint.
But the protection of trade secrets depends on two criteria. First, a trade secret
must exist and secondly, the covenantor must be able to undermine the trade
secret as a result of the knowledge'" of it.
But not all business-related knowledge is a trade secret. The basic criteria are:
Firstly, the information must not be publicly known, secondly, the information
must belong to the employer and thirdly, the information must have an economic
value for the employer.
Of course it is complicated to determine if particular information is not accessible
or publicly known. At least there is no doubt that the test depends only on
objective facts. It is not in the hands of the parties to make information a trade
secret merely by "declaring" particular information confidential.V
Another very important distinction that has to be made is between confidential
information and mere personal skill and knowledge, because the latter are not
protectable. Information that has been acquired during employment but which
constitutes general skill and knowledge cannot be protectable information. In
addition, it is not possible to protect information that is of general applicability in
an industry.F' But one has to keep in mind that this definition of trade secrets is
only valid for post-employment restraints. During employment the employee has a
much wider obligation to act with fidelity and good faith,84 therefore the
employee will be prohibited from disclosing a broader range of information.
Lastly, trade secrets can only be protected as long as they are secrets, meaning as
long as they are not publicly known. If a trade secret becomes publicly known it
cannot be protected any more, because otherwise it would lead to discrimination
against the covenantor.
3.1.3. OTHER INTERESTS
Basically every restraint has to be reasonable to be an effective restraint.
Therefore most possible cases will fit in one of the categories described above.
Hence, a restraint against mere competition, which ex-employees might generate,
cannot be justified by the restraint of trade doctrine.ê> Freedom from possible
future competition has not been regarded as a proprietary interest.ss The
possibility that the servant may be a competitor in the future is not a danger
81 The covenantor may only be restricted from utilizing the trade secret in so far as it is directly or indirectly derived from the employer.
82 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [19871Ch 117. 13.
83 Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby, [19161f AC 711.
84 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [19$7]Ch 117, 137.
85 Vincents of Reading v Fogden (1932) 48 TLR 613, 614.
86 PJ Sutherland op cit p 132.
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against which the master is entitled to safeguard himself.87 Freedom from
competition cannot be said to be an asset that belongs to the covenantee in a free
market society.
Restraints against the use of personal skill, knowledge and other personal
attributes are also not protectable. The courts have steadfastly refused to accept
the effectiveness of restrictions that inhibit employees in the use of their personal
skill, knowledge and other personal attributes. Personal skill is unprotectable even
if it has been acquired in the service of the employer or as a consequence of
training of the covenantor.f"
4. ONUS OF PROOF
This question usually arises in connexion with reasonableness. Ever since Mason v Provident
Clothing and Supply Co Ltd and Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby it has been standard doctrine
that the onus of proving circumstances enabling the court to conclude that a contract in
restraint of trade is reasonable in the interest of the covenantee is on the party seeking to
enforce the contract, while the onus of proving circumstances enabling the court to conclude
that it is against the public interest is on the party resisting enforcement.ê?
5. ATTITUDES OF THE COURT / WIDER REASONABLENESS ISSUES
Reasonableness factors beyond the interests of the covenantee will also have an influence on
the reasonableness question. But these factors are not simply weighed against the interests of
the covenantee.P? These further factors affect are more or less the "attitude" of the courts
towards interests.
Therefore the courts "developed" attitudes with regard to post-employment restraints as well
as to sale of business restrictions. Hence, different interests are protectable in those cases.
Furthermore, acknowledgement clauses have to be inspected under the rubric of wider
reasonable issues. Basically the acceptance of reasonableness by a clause in the contract
(Acknowledgement clause) is ineffective, because such a clause constitutes an attempt to oust
the jurisdiction of the courts.?'
Another topic that has to be discussed under the wider reasonable issues is the payment of a
consideration, and the two questions that arise in this context. Firstly, is it obligatory to pay a
consideration? And secondly, can a unreasonable restraint become a reasonable one, if the
consideration is high enough?
87 MP Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's law of Contract (1991).
88 PI Sutherland op cit p 133.
89 ID Heydon op cit p 28.
9°1>TSutherland op Cl~ P 193.
91 Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v Murphy 1989 SLT 450.
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The latter question is easily answered. An invalid restraint can never become a reasonable one,
merely because a consideration is paid.
But that does not mean automatically, that it is superfluous to pay a consideration at all.
Adequate consideration will still have a considerable role to play in the determination of
reasonableness.P? Where there is adequate consideration, the courts will be more benevolent
towards protecting the covenantee. However, where adequate consideration is lacking the
courts will meticulously ensure that only clear legitimate interests are protected.I"
Consideration in this case means not only effective payments to the covenantor but also other
means of consideration, such as the duration of an employment contract as consideration for
a restraint.?"
6. WHEN MUST REASONABLENESS BE DETERMINED
The question whether a contract is acceptable or ineffective may differ depending on the time
at which such reasonableness is derermined.ï" Facts may intercede between the making of the
contract and the coming to the court of the restraint, and these may influence the
effectiveness of the contract. Nevertheless, it is common opinion that questions of
ineffectiveness have to be determined at the moment when the restraint is concluded. Both
reasonableness inter partes and reasonableness in the public interest will be so determined. But
the reasonableness should be determined by looking at what was likely from this point.
7. SCOPE OF PROTECTABLE INTERESTS
The restraint cannot go further than IS adequate for the protection of the covenantee's
legitimate proprietary interest.
7.1. VAGUENESS OF RESTRAINT
Restrictions can be limited as to time, space and activity. The techniques will have to be
used in a manner which does not make the restraint void for vagueness.P'' General
vagueness principles will apply here.
7.2. AREA RESTRAINT
Basically, a restraint must be limited to the area where it is necessary for the protection of
the legitimate interests of the covenantee. Spatial restraints have at least to be limited to
the sphere of activity and interest of the covenantee. Furthermore they have to be
restricted to the legitimate interests of the covenantee, which will necessarily mean that
restraints will sometimes have to be narrower than the sphere of business of the
92 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co, Ltd [1894]AC 565.
93 Attwood v Lamont [1920]3 KB 571, 589.
94 ~ Heydon op cit p 135.
95 D Heydon op cit p 133.
96 arshalls Ltd v Leek (1900) 17 TIR 26.
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covenantee. Spatial reasonableness will depend on the facts of a particular case. If there is,
for instance, a clause that denies setting up a business from a particular base within a
certain area (brass plate covenant), you will have to consider whether the restricted
activities from the prohibited place for setting up a business will interfere with the
legitimate interest. If there is, for instance, a clause that denies certain business activities in
the restricted area, you will have to determine whether the restricted activity will interfere
with legitimate interest of the covenantee if carried on within the restricted area.
7.2.1. POST-EMPLOYMENT CASES
Area restraints concerning customer connections especially in post-employment
cases have to be covered by legitimate interests as mentioned above. But it is not
necessary to show that the trade has been practised in all parts of the restricted
area. It is sufficient if a certain density is reached.
Another question arises, if an employer has particular customers and he intends to
restrict an employee from competing with these customers, meaning that the
employee can work in the area as long as he does not deal with these customers.
Such a restraint is possible but not very useful because it is difficult to enforce.
In cases of trade secrets spatial restraints are less important, because trade secrets
are not bound to a specific area.
7.3. TEMPORAL DIMENSION
The duration while the employee is under restraint must be reasonable as well and
therefore the restraint must not exceed legitimate interests. Or as BLAKE stated: A
restraint may only endure for as long as it will take for the "risk of injury to be reasonably
moderated" 97.
7.3.1. TRADE CONNECTIONS
In early decisions it was held that the restraint might not be longer than the
foreseeable duration of customer relationships with the employer'". Yet this is not
sufficient. The courts should consider how long it will take for the covenantor to
lose the hold gained over customers because of his employrnent.??
7.3.2. TRADE SECRETS
Trade secrets do not justify keeping a man out of his trade indefinitely'P'.
97 Blake op cit p 677.
98 M & S Drapers v Reynolds [195613 All ER 814, 819-20.
99 Eastes v Russ [19141 1 eh 468, 4<)0.
100 JD Heydon op cit 133.
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Where trade secrets are protected the restraint may endure for as long as such
information constitutes a trade secret in the hands of the covenantee; this will be
for as long as the knowledge remains secret, reasonably up to date and valuable.
The trade secrets may only be protected while it constitutes a useful trade secret
in the covenantor's hands'?'.
7.3.3. POST-EMPLOYMENT
It is theoretically and practically likely that a restraint in an employment case may
be invalid for the sole reason that it is too long in duration 102. The protectable
interest must exist for the whole period of the restraint.
7.4. RESTRICTION ON THE ACTIVITIES
The activities of the covenantor may be not further restricted than is necessary for the
reasonable protection of the legitimate interest of the covenantee. Further, the restrictions
must also be not too vague. For instance a restraint "not to compete or interfere with the
business of the covenantee" would be invalid, because it is too difficult for the
covenantor to determine what he is obliged not to do.
Problems arise also concerning activity restrictions based on certain or all of the activities
of the business for which the employee worked, or certain or all of the activities of the
business sold. A restraint will often be ineffective for being wider than the protection of
any interest of the covenantee if it restricts wider activities than those exercised by the
business of the employer, in post-employment cases, or the business sold, in sale of
business restraints.l'ê
A more interesting topic concerning possible activities IS the distinction between non-
dealing and non-solicitation restraints.
Basically only those customers with whom the covenantor has formed connections are
protectable. But there are two possibilities in restraining the covenantor, firstly, by a non-
dealing restraint and secondly, by a non-solicitation restraint.
7.4.1. NON-DEALING
In non-dealing cases the covenantor is under no circumstances allowed to do
business with the customers of the covenantee. He is restrained from dealing
with particular customers, even if the customers come to the covenantor. Such a
restraint will be allowed in sale of goodwill cases, because in these cases a wider
protection will be allowed.lv' In cases of confidential information a wider
101 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 ChD 359, 366-7.
102 Nordenfeit v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co, Ltd [1894] AC 666.
103 Avery v Langford (1854) 1 Kay 663, 665.
104 JD Heydon op cit 163.
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protection will normally also be justifiable. In cases where trade secrets are
concerned it depends on the information.
7.4.2. NON-SOLICITATION
In non-solicitation cases the covenantor may still do business with the customers
of the covenantee in the field in which he was employed by the covenantor, but
he may only deal with customers who come to him of their own accord; he may
not attempt to convince them to change allegiance. A non-solicitation restraint is
possible in cases of sale of goodwill, in cases where confidential information is
protected and also where trade secrets are concerned. A non-solicitation restraint
stipulates a narrower protection as a non-dealing restraint. Therefore, at least it is
possible in all cases where a non-dealing restraint is possible to also use a non-
solicitation restraint.
7.4.3. NON-DISCLOSURE AND NON-USE OF TRADE SECRETS
It is also possible to restrain somebody by a non-disclosure or non-use of trade
secrets restraint. However, it is not a good way to protect trade secrets, and it is
therefore not very much liked by the courts. One of the reasons is, that such
restraints cannot be policed very effectively.
8. THE PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIREMENT
According to the NordenfeIt test a restraint of trade must not only be reasonable in the interest
of the parties, but must also not be against the public interest. While the "first leg" of the
Norderfeli test asks if the restraint is reasonable inter partes, the "second leg" of the NordenfeIt
test is a check-and-catch-all test. It allows for the consideration of relevant public policy
elements that have not been discounted by reasonableness inter partes. lOS Therefore it is
important to ask what public policy factors should be dealt with in terms of the public interest
leg. The public policy factors are:
8.1. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS
It has been suggested that economic arguments may be considered by the court.l-"
However in Texaco,o7 it was stated that the doctrine is not aimed at producing the "utmost
economic advantage". The restraint of trade doctrine is not a doctrine of economics but
rather a doctrine of the common law. Therefore the House of Lords in The Pharmaceutical
Sociery if Great Britain v Dickson108 followed a careful and sophisticated approach. The case
concerned limitations by the Pharmaceutical Society on the type of products that could be
105 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co, Ltd [1894]AC S66.
106 ID Heydon op cit pp 214ff.
107 'rexaco Ltd vMulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972]1 WLR 814, 827.
108 [1968] 2 All ER 686, 69Sff.
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sold by pharmacies. As a result small pharmacies in small villages decreased and the
competition between pharmacies was diminished. In this case, LORDMORRISfor instance
argued that restraints of this nature also have to be in the public interest, but he only
looked at this when he discussed the wider interests that can be protected.
8.2. FREEDOM OF WORK-RELATED PUBLIC INTEREST
The most important public interest argument for the contract denier will concern
freedom of work issues. And within this category probably the most important issue is the
hardship to third parties, through interference with the right to work.P? In cases of anti-
poaching contracts, where the "other" employer is not part of the particular contractual
relationship, the interests of employees who are the object of the anti-poaching contract
will have to be protected by utilising the public policy interest requirement.U? A restraint
may be contrary to public interest if it merely interferes with the interests of a particular
outside group even if the restraint is not contrary to the interests of society as a whole. I II
But, on the other side, it has been accepted that a medical man may be restricted even
though the public will be deprived of his service'{-
9. SEVERABILITY OR PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT
Basically the ineffectiveness of the stipulated contractual restraint will never affect the
underlying contract.
But the question is what happens to the restraint clause or clauses if it or they are ineffective.
Naturally there is no problem, if all clauses are enforceable or all of them are ineffective. The
question of partial enforcement arises only if there are both void and enforceable parts.
In this regard English courts follow a very technical approach (blue pencil test). Basically it is
trite that only parts that are too wide will be deleted; words, or the word order of a restraint
clause, will not be altered.U> Secondly, courts will only allow severance by deleting if it does
not change the meaning of what remains, and the effective part must be independent. Lastly.,
only clauses that the parties regarded as independent may be severed.
Parties sometimes add a term to a restraint in which they acknowledge that some parts of the
restraint agreement are intended to be severable from other parts. The status of these clauses
is very problematic. The acknowledgement clause will sometimes merely restate the accepted
principles of severability. In such a case the clause will be of no real value. An
acknowledgement clause only has real value if the intention of the parties and the manner they
express will impact on the extent to which the court will be prepared to sever clauses. In other
109 GH Treite! "The Law of Contract" (1999) 413-4.
110 Kores Manufactoring Co Ltd v Kalak Manufactoring Co Ltd [1959]1 Ch 108, 120.
III Ibidp 127.
112 PJ Sutherland op cit p. 241.
I\3 Baker v Hedgecock (1888) 39 Chd 520.
20
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
words, courts will have to look at the acknowledgement clause, and will then have to
determine whether it applies in a particular situation, and whether it changes the severability
position if it is read with other relevant clauses.
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PART III: THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA
1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA
l.I.LEGAL SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA
It is outside the scope of this dissertation to explain the roots of South African law and
legislation. But in a nutshell South African law was influenced over a long period of time
by the colonial powers. In the 16th century it was influenced by the Dutch colonial rule
that brought the Roman-Dutch law with them. Later South Africa as a colony of the
Crown was subjected to the English legal system.
After England gained power over South Africa, in some cases where a restraint of trade
was involved, courts contended that English law applied in this area.U" But this is not the
view generally taken. Rather the question is whether South African courts are free to
modify the English law doctrine in South Africa.lls Indeed, a restraint of trade rule or
principle cannot be applicable in South Africa simply because it applies in English law.116
As Sutherland PJ stated, the doctrine is most accurately anchored in South Africa via the
Roman-Dutch principle that contracts which are contrary to public policy are illegal.!'?
Whether the doctrine that is used nowadays is the adopted English doctrine or a very
similar one reproduced on Roman-Dutch principles, does not have to be decided in this
dissertation.Uf
Anyway, the English doctrine was used in South Africa; during the earlier days more
strictly and later in a laxer way. In 1984 the renunciation of the English law culminated in
the Magna .Alloys'" judgement.
1.2. MAGNA ALLOYS CASE
One of the important matters in the Magna Al/rys Case is that it was accepted that some
restraints were still illegal due to different public policy values in South Africa.12o It was
stated that restraint of trade problems had to be dealt with in terms of South African
principles of public policy.t-" However, the court did not really discuss the principles that
made South African law different from English law, and the case is opaquel-? in laying
down more specific rules. The consequence of the Magna Al/rys case will probably be that
some change of emphasis concerning public interest will take place, and that the
114 Durban Rickshas Ltd v Ball 1933 NPD 479, 489.
115 Katz v Efthimiou 1948 (4) SA 603 (Ol 610.
116 Federal Insurance Corp of SA Ltd v Van Almelo (1908) 25 SC 940, 943.
117 PJ Sutherland op cit p 13.
118 Cfibid 12-3.
119 Magna 1]oys and Research (SA) (Pry) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A).
120 Ibid P 891.
121 Ibid pp 892 ff.
122 JT Schoombee "Agreements in Restraint of Trade: The Appellate Division Confirms New Principles" (1985) 48 THRHR 139.
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importance of traditional public interest factors will be slightly enhanced, but this
constitutes no real departure from the English position.
The following paragraphs will point out some important differences between the English
and South African systems.
2. TIME OF DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS
One of the main differences between the English and the South African systems of
determining if a restraint is void or enforceable is the fact, that the time of determination is
different. This fact has various influences on other aspects of the restraint of trade doctrine,
and therefore it has to be dealt with first.
The question as to whether a contract is void or enforceable depends very often on the time
at which such reasonableness is determined. For instance, facts may intercede between the
time when the contract was concluded and brought to court, and public policy values tend to
change over the years.
As mentioned above, it is trite 10 England that questions of ineffectiveness have to be
determined at the moment when the restraint is concluded. Both, reasonableness inter partes
and reasonableness in the public interest will be so determined.
Yet, the South African approach is quite different. Over time the courts steadily developed the
view that the reasonableness of the restraint has to be determined at the moment when the
court is asked to enforce it. Since RABIE CJ accepted that in the in the Appeal Court decision
in Magna AI/ryP; there is no influential opinion left. This does not mean that you only have to
examine the time of enforcement of the restraint. You also have to examine the reasonable
foreseeability from the moment when the courts are asked to enforce restraints, as well as
reasonableness during the entire duration of the restraint.
Due to this different approach, some linked topics have to be dealt with in a modified way.
3. ONUS OF PROOF
In both the English and South African legal systems, the onus to determine whether a
restraint falls within the restraint of trade doctrine will probably be on the party who wants to
rely on the doctrine.l>' But when it comes to the onus within the restraint of trade doctrine
South African courts follow a different approach to those in England. In early cases, the onus
of proof was handled as in England. They accepted that restraints were prima facie ineffective.
The onus for proving reasonableness was on the enforcer.t-'' The onus to show that the
contract is against public interest was on the denier once reasonableness was proved. Careful
123 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pry) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 894, 895-8.
124 Cf PJ Sutherland op cit p 25Ó.
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developments away from the English approach took place in the late 60s and culminated as
well in the Magna .Alloys'" case. RABIE CJ decided that the onus of proving all aspects of
illegalitywill be on the person who relies on it. However the onus of proof is on the denier in
cases where it has to be shown that the restraint is unreasonable or against public interest for
other reasons. The reasonableness and public interest onus will no longer be distinguished in
South Africa.l-? The onus will simply remain on the denier once reasonableness is proved.
4. SECOND LEG OF NORDENFELDT TEST
As described above the substantive question as to whether a restraint is enforceable or not, is
examined firstly inter partes and secondly by examining if the restraint clause is against public
interest (second leg of NordenfeIt test).
In South Africa the role of public interest was enhanced by the judgment of Magna .Alloys. The
Appeal Court in this decision stressed the importance of public interest. However, a greater
consideration of public interest issues has not materialized.F" One will have to see, how South
African courts will use their gained flexibility.
5. PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT
Before Magna AI/qys courts in South Africa followed principles that are very similar to those
that apply in England. It was regarded as the minimum requirement that the court would not
change or add words to a contract. Yet, the courts follow a different approach. They have
accepted that the question in a restraint of trade clause is one that pertains to enforceability at
the time when the restraint is brought before the court. Hence, they have stressed that the
problem is one of "partial enforcement" rather than "severability". This partial enforcement
principle was supported in an obiter dictum by Judge RABIE CJ in Magna Al/qyS.129
However, the basic principles that now should apply were laid down in National Chemsearch.130
Therefore, the court should deal with this topic in the light of public policy. The courts should
be prepared to restrict a clause whether by adding, deleting or changing words contained in
the clause, although partial enforcement will only take place within narrow parameters.P!
Judge Botha J stipulated in National Chemsearch that restraints will only be partially enforced if
certain requirements are met.132 Firstly, the party who is seeking partial enforcement must
raise the issue and lay a basis for it. A court will not partially enforce a restraint if alternatives
are not proposed by the enforcer. Secondly, the reformulation of the particular clause must
not be dramatic and the clause must not require "major plastic surgery". Thirdly, only
125 KWV van ZA Bpk v Botha 1923 CPD 429, 437-8.
126 Magna Alloys ana Research (SA) (Pry) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 893, 897.
127 SchalkVan der Merve, LF Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke, GF Lubbe,JG Lotz "Contract General Principles"(1959) 157.
128 PJ Sutherland op cit p 235.
129 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pry) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 896.
130 National Chernsearch (SA) (Pry) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (f) 1112ff.
131 PTSutherland op cit p 300.
132 N'ational Chern search (SA) (Pry) Ltd v Borrowman 1979 (3) SA 1092 (f) 1116£f.
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restraints should be saved, that are clumsily - not deliberately - drawn too wide. Lastly, the
party to be restrained must not be unfairly or harshly affected by the restraint.
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CLAUSE
As mentioned above, courts decided in England that clauses wherein parties acknowledge that
a certain restraint in a contract is reasonable, are invalid, because such clauses are an attempt
to oust the jurisdiction of the courts.
In South Africa, a different view was taken: the courts distinguished contracts where the
parties were in an unequal bargaining position and where parties were in a relatively equal
bargaining position. In the latter situation, the acknowledgement clauses should at least have
an attitudinal impact.l=
133 Roffey v Catterall Edwards and Goudre 1977 (4) SA 494 (Nl 499.
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PART IV: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE RULES IN GERMANY
1. DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST RESTRAINT OF TRADE RULES
In contrast to the English developments, German restraint of trade rules developed some
centuries later. The German legislation was characterised by the doctrine of "freedom of trade".
Therefore neither in the very early General German Commercial Code134 from 1861 nor in the
Industrial Codel35 from 1889 could one find any regulations concerning restraint of trade. They
simply applied the doctrine of "freedom of trade". However the Supreme Court of the German
Reich 136 decided in 1893 that a restraint of trade clause is invalid if the covenantor's ability to
work is restricted too much in general or within a particular branch. It decided that "every
employee has a non-seizeable right to decide about the kind and branch of his job" and therefore
"he must not be permanently or at all restricted from any business enterprise" .137
The first legal regulations were developed at the turn of the century. Sec. 74 and sec. 75
Commercial Code13s, governing regulations concerning commercial employees'ê", came into
force on 01.01.1900. In those times, no regulations forced the covenantee to pay a consideration,
although only those restraints were enforceable that did not exceed a time span of 3 years and did
not unfairly impede the development of the covenantor. In 1900 also a regulation (sec. 133f
Industrial Code) came into force, that stipulated the same rules for technical employees 140.
2. 1914 REVISION OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE
In 1914 the Commercial Code was revised and the protection of the commercial employees was
considerably improved. Since then, by virtue of sec. 74 (2) Commercial Code all restraints were
void that exceeded the duration of two years. Also very important was the introduction of the
obligation to pay a compulsory compensation of at least 50% of the last salary.l+' However, the
latter regulation only applied to restraints of commercial employees and not to technical
employees.
3. CHANGES BY LEGISLATION
Since 1914 sec. 74 ff has remained almost unchanged. But since then courts and commentators
have been discussing the inequality of commercial employees and technical employees. Courts
were divided on whether to abolish the inequality or not. In the beginning the Federal Labour
Court142 introduced an obligatory compensation also for technical employees, by utilizing sec.
134 In German: ,,Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB)".
135 In German: "Gewerbeordung (GewO)".
136 In German: .Reichsgerichr (RG)".
137 RGZ 31 97 100
138 In Gerrr:an: '"Ha~delsgesetzbuch (HGB)".
\39 In German: "kaufmiinnische Angestellete".
140 In German: "technische Angestellete".
141 Sec. 74 (2) Commercial Code.
142 In German: "Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG)".
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138 Civil Code.143 Later, in 1966, the Federal Labour Court also applied sec. 74 ff contra legem to
restraints on technical emplcyeest+' - like e.g. engineers. In the same way the Federal Labour
Court applied sec. 74 ff also to restraints on workers.
In its decision from 13.09.1969 the Federal Labour Court turned away from its previously
followed view and decided that sec. 74 ff would have to be applied to all kinds of employees but
analogically not directly.l-> This last decision was more a kind of cosmetic decision, and had no
real impact on the legal status of restraint of trade clauses.
During the following years the Federal Labour Court "revised" the restraint of trade rules, by
holding that particular regulations'< were unconstitutional, because they violated the German
Constitution 147because they violated the right to equality and freedom to choose an occupation.
In the following years those unconstitutional provisions, as well as sec. 133f Industrial Code was
repealed+"
4. 2002 REVISION OF LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
In 2002 the legislator completely revised the whole law of obligations. It was the biggest revision
of the Civil Code since 1900. In this process the legislator decided among other major changes to
apply the law of general terms and conditions also to restraint of trade clauses. The influences of
this change in legislation will be discussed later.
5. FACTS ABOUT RESTRAINT CLAUSES IN GERMANY
Different surveys were made in Germany to examine how important restraint clauses in
employment contracts are. In 1990 HANAU /PREISI49 found out, that 2.2% of employees who
were paid by a tariff, 5.0% of employees that were paid above tariff and 10.5% of executive
employees were restrained by a clause in their employment contract, and 16% of salesmen
concluded a restraint clause. The duration of the restraint was two years in 73% of all cases. The
stipulated compensation in 55% of all cases was based on the legal minimum requirements. In
12% of the cases the full remuneration was in fact paid as a compensation. Managing directors
were even restrained by 35% and got a compensation of between 50% and 100% (on average
64%).150
143 InGennan:"BurgerlichesGesetzbuch(BGB)".
144 BAG2.12.1966and18.12.1967AP18,19zu~133fGewO.
145 Obviouslysec.74ff havetobeafplieddirectlytocommercial emploees.
146 Sec.75(3),Sec.74a(2)sentence,Sec.75bsentence2,Sec.75bsentenceI, Sec.75e.
147 InGerman: "Grundgesetz(GG)".
148 (as a matter of form).
149 P Hanau/UPreis"OerArbeitsverrrag"(Loseiea£)B.1.pp46ff.
150 KienbaumVergurungsreport 1995,76.
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PART V: THE SYSTEM OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN GERMANY
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.GENERAL RESTRAINT OF TRADE RULES
In German law there are no statutory prohibitions of competition, neither for particular
groups of employees nor for any employees. The only provisions that exist are restraint of
trade rules regulating the competition during the employment. Such rules are, for instance,
sec. 60 Commercial Code, restricting commercial employees during the employment,
sec. 112, 113 Commercial Code and sec. 88 Company Law151, restricting partners of
general partnership or executive board members during the employment.
1.2. PROHIBITION OF COMPETITION DURING THE EMPLOYMENT
Basically the employee is prohibited from working for a competitor while he is employed.
This rule is laid down in sec. 60 and 61 Commercial code, and has to be applied to all
employees.t= It was stated that if the employee earns his living from a certain employer
he is prohibited from competing in that way, as the employer is endangered in his
business activities.l=
1.3. POST-EMPLOYMENT CASES
After leaving the employer's business, the employer has basically no right to restrict the
employee from using his legally gathered skills and experiences and from competing with
his former employer. Such a restraint is only possible, valid and enforceable, if the parties
concluded an agreement that is not against the regulations of sec. 74 ff Commercial Code.
These restraint of trade rules acknowledge an interest of the employer to protect himself
from competition of the former employee, but also guarantees the employee an
opportunity to decide about his career independently and to choose a vacancy freely.154
1.4. CONFIDENTIAL DATA AND TRADE SECRETS
By virtue of sec. 17(1) Unfair Competition Act155it is made a punishable offence, to use
or divulge trade secrets during the employment period. But by virtue of sec. 17(2)Unfair
Competition Act the use of trade secrets that were gathered unauthorised is also
prohibited. Unauthorised in that context means if, for instance, the employee copies or
remembers certain information in a specific way.156Or as stated in the Federal Supreme
151 In German: "Aktiengesetz (AktG)".
152 BAG EzA ~ 4 KSchG Nr 38
153 T Mu'ller "Vertragliches W~ttbewerbsverbot" (2000), FA 2000,152.
154 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court, in German: .Bundesgerichrshof (BGH)" in BGH, AP 2 zu § 75f HGB.
155 In German: "Gesetz gegen den unIauteren Wettbewerb (UWG)".
156 Cf. J Kunz "Betriebs- und Geschaftsgeheimnisse und Wettbewerbsverbot wahrend der Dauer und nach Beendigung des
Anstellungsverhaltnises" (1993), DB 1993, 2482.
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Courtl>", all information that is taken out of the employer's business "by all methods
exceeding the normal remembrance" is gathered unauthorised.
Of course there are also more specific regulations like sec. 18 Unfair Competition Act
that stipulates certain obligations to return written documents and punishes industrial
esplonage.
1.5. BLANKET CLAUSES: SEC 241(2), 242 CIVIL CODE
As mentioned above, there are no statutory prohibitions of competition in German law.
However, that does not mean that there are no restrictions for a former employee to
compete with his former employer.
Due to sec. 241 (2) Civil Code the employee has not only during but also after his
employment certain collateral duties. A very disputed topic is, to what extent a former
employee can attract customers of the former employer. On that topic, the Federal
Labour Court decided, that an employee is not restricted in attracting customers of his
former employer and is also allowed to use technical knowledge or experiences, if they
concluded no restraint of trade agreement. It further stated, however, that in cases where
the employer prepares a contract with a customer to that extent that the conclusion of the
contract is just a mere formality, the former employee breaches his duties, if he then
attracts the customer to his business.
2. SCOPE OF THE POST-EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS
2.1. SUBJECTS OF THE RULES
As mentioned above, the law of restraint of trade is divided into different areas and
therefore regulated in different statutes. This dissertation deals mainly with the restraint of
trade rules concerning post-employment restraints. In German law the rules of post-
employment restraints are laid down in sec. 74 ff Commercial Code and Sec. 138, 241,
242 Civil Code. In the following paragraphs the restraint of trade law will be examined
with reference to this focus.
As we have seen subjects of the restraint of trade rules can only be the employers and
employees. As mentioned above, the sec. 74 ff Commercial Code nowadays will be
applied not only to commercial employees, but also to all other kinds of employees
analogously. In fact there is no factual difference. The courts apply the rules to all kinds
of ernployees.l'f
157 BGHZ 38 391
158 All formeriy stipulated exceptions were repealed.
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2.2. TIME OF CONCLUSION OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE AGREEMENT
As mentioned above, there is only a minimum protection against post-employment
competition, if the parties did not conclude a restraint of trade agreement.
If the parties - usually the employer - want to conclude a restraint of trade clause with the
employee, normally such a restraint of trade agreement is part of the employment
contract in the form of a restraint of trade clause. It is also, however, possible to conclude
such an agreement later; but the agreement has to be concluded during an employment
relationship. It can be concluded, therefore, even after giving notice of terminating the
employment contract, but before termination of the employment relationship - within the
termination period.
If the restraint of trade agreement is concluded after termination of the employment
relationship, the sec. 74 ff Commercial Code are no longer applicable, the relevant
regulations are rather sec. 138, 242 Civil Code. The consequences are basically the same as
restraints of executive officers of company boards.l>?
3. DEFECT OF TITLE AND CONSEQUENCES
If one of the parties violates regulations that are laid down in sec. 74ff Commercial Code,
different consequences will be triggered off. The basic consequence is laid down in sec. 7Sd
sentence 1 Commercial Code. By virtue of this rule, the principal cannot assert rights .that
disadvantage an employee more than stipulated in sec. 74 ff Commercial Code. This also
applies to agreements intended, by means of set-off or other methods, to circumvent legal
provisions concerning the minimum compensation. In other sections, some further
consequences are stipulated. For instance in sec. 74(2) Commercial Code the expression "is
only binding" is used, and in sec. 74a(1) Commercial Code the words "is non-binding insofar"
are used. Therefore, repeatedly discussions started how to interpret those different words and
concepts.lw Over time a system developed that now deals with three fundamentally different
sanctions. Firstly, agreements can be void, or secondly, can be non-binding and thirdly, can be
partiJ non-binding.
3.1. VOID AGREEMENTS
As mentioned above, some of the violations lead directly to the nullity of restraint clause.
Nullity in this context means that none of the contracting parties can derive any right
from the restraint of trade clause. Judges and commentators expressly stated that in the
following cases the restraint of trade agreement will be void.
159 See V 13. infra.
160 Cf. D Loffl, "Die Behandlung unzulassiger Wettbewerbsverbote", 1968.
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• By virtue of sec. 74(1) Commercial Code the restraint agreement must be in writing,
and a copy of the document must be signed by the principal. Furthermore, the
agreement has to contain the agreed conditions and has to be provided to the
employee. If this formality is not followed, the agreement is void.l''!
• By virtue of sec. 74(2) Commercial Code the employer has to pay compensation to
the employee. If the agreement does not stipulate any compensation, the agreement is
void.162
• By virtue of sec. 74a(2) sentence 1 Commercial Code the restraint agreement is void,
if the clerical employee is a minor at the time the contract was concluded.
• By virtue of sec. 5(1) sentence 1 Vocational Training Law163 a restraint agreement
with a trainee is basically void.164
• By virtue of sec. 74a(2) sentence 1 Commercial Code the restraint agreement is void,
if the principal causes the clerical employee to give his word of honor or a similar
assurance.
• By virtue of sec. 74a(ii) sentence 2 Commercial Code the agreement by which a third
party, in lieu of the clerical employee, assumes the obligation to ensure that the
clerical employee will restrict his professional activity following the end of the
employment relationship, is void.
• Except these rules, stipulated in the Commercial Code, there are also some other
regulations applicable, like sec. 9 no. 5 Law on Temporary Employment.l= And
obviously the general rules about nullity of agreements like sec. 143, 119, 123, 138 and
104 ff Civil Code will apply.
As consequence of the nullity of an agreement, none of the contracting parties can derive
any right from the restraint of trade clause. The employer cannot prohibit the employee
from taking up some work, and nor can the employee claim compensation from the
employer. Both parties can plead anytime that the agreement is void. Even if the
employee consciously takes up some work and the employer pays compensation, both
parties can untie themselves from the agreement. If a restraint clause is carried out in
ignorance of the nullity of the agreement, the clause is void and therefore the parties have
a right to be refunded in accordance with the rules of unjustified enrichment.
161 See V 4. i1llra.
162 See V 8. i1lfra.
163 In German: "Berufsbildungsgesetz (BBiG)".
16~ Except if the restraint is concluded within the last6 month of the trainee period, and the trainee is employed afterwords.
16, In German: "Arbeltnehmeriiberlassungsgesetz (AUG)".
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3.2. NON-BINDING AGREEMENTS
In some cases the sec 74 ff Commercial Code stipulates that a clause is non-binding
(unverbindlich). The legal concept behind this expression is, that such a clause is basically
valid and enforceable. Nevertheless, the employee has the option to decide whether to
enforce the clause or not. The employer does not have such a right; he is bound by the
decision made by the employee. Judiciary and commentators commented that in the
following cases the restraint of trade agreement will be non-binding.
• By virtue of sec. 74(2) Commercial Code the restraint clause is only binding where the
principal is obligated, for the term of the prohibition, to pay annual compensation
equal to at least one-half of the most recent contractual remuneration received by the
clerical employee. In other words, the agreement is non-binding, if the employer
promised a compensation, but the compensation is too low.166
• By virtue of sec. 74a(1) sentence 1 Commercial Code the restraint clause is non-
binding insofar as it does not serve to protect a legitimate business interest of the
principal. This would be the case for instance, if the employer only wanted to protect
himself against mere competition of the employee.l'"
• By virtue of sec. 74a(1) sentence 2 Commercial Code the restraint clause is non-
binding insofar as, with respect to the compensation allowed, the place, time or
subject matter, it constitutes an unreasonable interference with the clerical employee's
career. This would be for instance the case, if the restraint clause would totally sterilize
an employee from working in his profession.l'f
For quite a while it was unclear, which consequences would apply if a clause or agreement
is non-binding. In some early decisions, the Federal Labour Court'v? judged that the
employee simply does not need to comply with the agreement whereas the employer has
no rights against the employee. However, these judgments only helped those employees
that wanted to escape from the agreements po In a slightly later decision the Federal
Labour Court!" also decided, that the employee had to decide whether he wanted to be
bound by the agreement or not.172 According to a new decision of the Federal Labour
Court173 the employee now has basically a duty to give notice to the employer, whether he
wants to enforce the restraint clause or not. It simply depends on the behaviour of the
employee after termination of the employment-relationship. However, the employee is
bound by his decision, once he gives notice to the employer to enforce the clause or not.
166 See V 8. irfra.
167 See V 5.and V 7. irfra.
168 See V 7. infra.
169 BAG, AP I zu § 75 a HGB und 21, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33 zu § 74 HGB.
170 W Grunsky, "Festschrift 25 Jahre BAG", ISS.
171 BAG, AP 36, 37, 53 zu ~ 74 HGB,
172 Some exceptions applied, for instance if the status of a termination notice was not yet decided by the court.
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If he gives notice, to the effect that he wants to enforce the clause dogmatically the clause
gets unrestricted valid. On the other hand, if he gives notice, to the effect that he does not
want to enforce the clause, dogmatically the notice becomes a waiver for the purpose of
sec. 397 Civil Code.
Lastly, the employer has a right to request the employee to make a decision, whether he
wants to enforce the agreement or not. If the employee does not answer within a
reasonable time, the right to enforce the agreement or not devolves upon the employer.F"
3.3. PARTLY NON-BINDING AGREEMENTS
In some cases the sec. 74 ff Commercial Code stipulates that a clause is partly non-
binding ("teilweise unverbindlich"). Sometimes a restraint clause is not void or non-
binding in total. It is possible, that a clause can be only partly non-binding, because only
in one respect the prescribed limits were exceeded. Judiciary and commentators stated
that only in the following cases the restraint of trade agreement can also be partly void or
partly non-binding:
• By virtue of sec. 74a(i) sentence 1 Commercial Code the restraint clause is non-
binding insofar as it does not serve to protect a legitimate business interest of the
principal. Mostly cases fall under this provision, where employees were restrained in
areas or branches, where they could not be "dangerous" for the employer. If there are
no business interests of the employer at all, then the clause will be completely non-
binding. The same applies to the provision of sec. 74a(i) sentence 2 Commercial
Code, where the restraint clause IS non-binding insofar as, with respect to the
compensation allowed, the place, time or subject matter, it constitutes an
unreasonable interference with the clerical employee's career.
• By virtue of sec. 74a(i) sentence 3 Commercial Code the restraint clause cannot
extend beyond a period of two years following the end of the employment
relationship. Therefore the restraint is also non-binding insofar it is longer than two
years.
4. FORM OF THE AGREEMENT
By virtue of sec. 74(i) Commercial Code the restraint agreement must be in writing, and a
copy of the document signed by the principal and containing the agreed conditions must be
provided to the clerical employee.
The reason for the provision that the agreement must be in writing is unclear. BUCHNER175
stated that the main aim of the provision is to warn'76 the employee, concluding such an
173 BAG, AP 60 zu § 74 HGB.
174 Ibid.
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agreement. HEYMANN/HENSSLER177mention also the protection against someone's
unawareness'I'', However, the most important function is obviously the function of
documentationl79•
The provision that a copy of the document signed by the principal and containing the agreed
conditions must be provided to the clerical employee, sound very easy and unspectacular.
However, this provision is responsible for a vast number of void restraint of trade clauses.
In practice, many employers let the employee sign the deed and hand out only a photocopy of
it. In this case, the restraint clause is (correctly) in writing, but the employee did not receive a
signed copy of the document, he only received a copy of the signed deed.18o
5. PROTECTABLE ISSUES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE CLAUSES
5.1. DEFINITION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Sec. 74(1) Commercial Code defines a restraint clause as an "agreement ... which limits
the clerical employee in his business activity". Therefore it is necessary to determine what
a business activity is. The covenantor is basically restrained in working for a competitor.
However, he is not restrained from concluding legal contracts with competitors, as long
as he is not working for them. For instance, he can lease a property to a competitor or sell
them a patent.lê! The employee can also apply for a job, or he can even conclude an
employment contract, concerning the time after the restraint period.
5.2. RESTRAINTS ON FUNCTIONS AND RESTRAINTS OVER AWHOLE BRANCH
The Federal Labour Court182 often distinguishes between restraints on functions ill a
company and restraints over a whole branch or enumerated business.lêê An example of
the latter one is, where the employee is restricted from working for any insurance
company or e.g. Sanlam Ltd. An example of a restraint narrowed down by stipulating a
certain function is if the employee is restricted in working as an accountant. Both kinds of
restraints are basically possible, but the restraint over a whole branch is much more
effective, because it is easy to police it, whereas a restraint where the employee is
restricted in working as an accountant, can easily be ineffective if he is for instance
employed as a controller.lê"
175 H Buchner "Wettbewerbsverbote wahrend und nach Beendigung des Arbeitsverhaltnisses" (1995), C160.
176 In German· Warnfunktion"
177 E Heyma~ïl\1 Henssler "H~ndelsgestzbuch" (1995), §74 Rn. 18.
178 In German: "Ubereilungsschutz".
179 In German: "Dokumentationsfunkcion",
180 H Buchner op cit C 146.
181 K Bartenbacfi/FE Volz "Gesetz uber Arbeitnehmererfmdungen" (1997), § 8 Rn 54.
182 BAG, AP 24 zu § 133f GewO.
183 In German: "Tatlgkeits- und unternehmensbezogenen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen".
184 Cf. BAG, AP 24 zu § 133f GewO.
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5.3. EMPLOYEES AND SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS
The Federal Labour Court185 also distinguishes between restraints on starting as a
freelaneer or a self-employed person on the one hand, and restraints on taking up an
employment on the other. Restraint clauses, can include all elements or be narrowed
down to one of those elements.l's The Higher Regional Court Frankfurt'V decided, that a
clause that stipulates only that a person is restrained from taking up an employment with
a competitor, will not restrain him from becoming a self-employed person.
5.4. DEFINITION OF A COMPETING COMPANY
Numerous restraint clauses prohibit employees from working for "a competing
company"188. Although the provisions do not define what a competing company is.189As
the Higher Labour Court Koln190 decided, there must be more evidence, than just having
the same branch specification in the company name, or in the commercial register.
MARTENS191 proposes to define "a competing company" by using a spatial and product
orientaredl'? view. Due to his opinion, a competing company will be one that is
participating on the same market, where the same people satisfy their demand for goods
and services. If you would follow this approach an employee could change from a retailer
to a wholesaler. Rather the term of "a competing company" has to be defined more
generously.193 The Higher Labour Court Frankfurtl?! even decided that also the
production and sale of technically different products can cause a competitive relationship.
This is for instance the case if the products can be substituted for each other, like wooden
windows and plastic windows. Furthermore it is not obligatory that the whole range of
products is the same. The Federal Labour Courtl'" decided that is enough if 10% of the
products are overlapping.
Lastly, a non-competing company becomes "a competing company" if it starts to
compete with the covenantee after the particular employee started working there. It does
not matter if it is because the employee started working there, or not. In such a case the
employee has to leave the business immediately. However, the company does not become
only a competitor if it starts producing or selling certain goods, it already becomes a
competitor if it develops certain goods or prepares the product placement.
185 BAG,AP24zu § 133fGewO.
186 BAG,AP5zu§ 611BGB.
187 OLGFrankfurt,DB1973,139.
188 In German: "Konkurenzunternehmen".
189 Cf.EDomdorf"FreieArbeitsplatzwahlundRechtam Arbeitsergebnis"(1979),227ff.
190 LAGKiilnNZA1995994
191 KPMarten's"DasArb~itsre~htderleitendenAngesteUten"(1982),184.
192 InGerman:"Raumlichundgegenstandlich".
193 EDomdorfopcitpp 228f.
194 LAGFrankfurt,LAGE1zu~74aHGB
195 BAG,AP21zu§ 133fGewO.
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5.5. EMPLOYMENT BYA SERVICE PROVIDER, TAKER OR SUPPLIER
Another range of problems is worth discussing. Sec. 74 ff Commercial Code stipulates
that an employee can be restrained from being employed by a competitor, but what
happens if the employee is being employed by a service provider, a supplier or even a
customer. All those are normally not competitors to the covenantee. Therefore a restraint
clause, that only restrains a covenantor from being employed by a competitor, does not
restrain him from being employed by a service provider, supplier or customer. The
Federal Labour Court-'" simply stated that it is the matter of the covenantee, to draw a
proper clause, if he wants it to be protected.
5.6. NON-DEALING AND NON-SOLICITATION WITH FORMER CUSTOMERS
A possibility to narrow down restraints, is to restrain a covenantor from dealing with the
customers of the covenantee. As previously mentioned in the part, on the English
restraint of trade doctrine.l?? it is possible to conclude non-solicitation or even non-
dealing covenant. Both kinds are also known in Germany, and the same principles apply
as in common law. But German commentators emphasised, that it is a dangerous way to
narrow down a restraint, because the clause can easily become too vague. The Higher
Regional Court Diisseldorf198 stated that an agreement that merely stipulates that the
customers or clients of the covenantee are protected is ineffective. The covenantee has
rather to designate which customers or clients are protected and for how long.199The
parties should also stipulate if they only intend to conclude a non- solicitation restraint or
a general non-dealing restraint.
5.7. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PARTIES
Due to sec. 74a(2) sentence 2 Commercial Code an agreement by which a third party, in
lieu of the clerical employee, assumes the obligation to ensure that the clerical employee
will restrict his professional activity following the end of the employment relationship, is
void. In the past, this provision caused no problems. Judgments concerning this provision
are not known. An example for such a void agreement is, if a father, a brother or a wife
would assume the obligation to ensure that the son, the brother or husband will not work
for a competitor. Hence, this provision only applies to agreements between a third-party
and the covenantee.
More problematic are cases, where the covenantee concludes an agreement with a third-
party that restrains itself from competing with the covenantee. Such agreements are
sometimes concluded, if the employer fears that the employee will start a business after
196 BAG. AP 44zu § 611BGB.
197 See II 11.4.supra.
198 BAG, BB 199"4,1958.
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his employment relationship for instance under the name of his wife as a dummy. Such
agreements are always concluded as apart agreements with the actual covenantor
(employee). The agreement with the third-party is therefore only a supplement or
confirmation.ë'? Hence, this agreement is valid even if no further compensation is paid.
6. AREA OF RESTRAINT
Normally a restraint clause stipulates the area where the covenantor is restrained. However, in
practice sometimes problems arise because vague expressions are used. Basically a restraint
can be limited to a city, a county, a federal state or be stretched over the whole Federal
Republic of Germany. A restraint stretching over the territory of the European Union was
held to be dynamic, so that a competition would become illegal in a country that later joined
the European Union. Sometimes the area of a restraint is determined by using a clause like:
"the employee is restrained ... in all countries, where he worked during the last 2 years before
leaving the company" or "where the company maintains subsidiaries when the employee
leaves the company". Such agreements are basically valid, but the employer has the duty after
termination of the employment relationship to inform the employee about the extent of his
restraint.
If the restraint clause does not stipulate a certain area, basically a worldwide restraint is agreed.
Such worldwide agreements are not per se invalid; they even might be reasonable. However,
mostly the "legitimate business interest" of the employer will be missing. However, a too wide
area of the restraint is not too dangerous for the employer, because by virtue of sec. 74a(1)
Commercial Code the restraint is non-binding in the exceeding part - where the employer has
no legitimate business interest. In all other respects, the restraint stays valid.
Another kind of drawing spatial restrictions is to use a company-related formulation, like (1)
"An employee IS restrained from working for a company, that produces and sells
pharmaceuticals In Germany.", or (2) "An employee is restrained from working for a
company, that produces and sells pharmaceuticals. The prohibition applies in Germany." As
one can see, drafting in these cases is very difficult. In Example (1) for instance, an employee
is restrained in building up the sales structures in South Africa for a German pharmaceutical
company. Instead, he can be employed by a South African company, that does not produce or
sell medicine in Germany. In Example (2) on the other hand, it does not depend on the
company's activity but rather on the employee's activity. Therefore, he could change to a
South African company in South Africa that is active in Germany, but he would be restricted
in working within Germany for a foreign company, that does not produce or sell in Germany
at all.
199 Cf. M Thamm "Die rechtliche Bedeutung des Begriffs 'Kundenschutz'" (1995) BB 1995, 790.
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7. BORDERS OF RESTRAINTS
A restraint is only valid, if the employer has "a legitimate business interest". However, just this
term cases a lot of uncertainty. Every particular restraint clause can be proved by the courts, if
it matches the requirement of "a legitimate business interest". Therefore, numerous decisions
exist. The courts decided that every restraint clause has to match the legitimate business
interest in a substantial, special and temporal dimension. But if there is a legitimate business
interest, it needs not to be the only interest that was followed, it is only important that there is
at least one legitimate business interest.
7.1. SUBSTANTIAL BORDERS
Obviously, the employer must have a business interest, and not a private interest to
restrain the employee. However, not all business interests are protectabie. The courts
argued that there must be a final connection between the former employment and the
prohibited activity.ê'" Therefore trade secrets are particularly protectabie. But a limitation
on bearers of official secrets was explicitly denied by the Federal Labour Court.202 Rather,
an employer has a legitimate interest, if he wants to protect himself from being deprived
of his customers, because the employee gained knowledge about them, when he worked
for the employer.203 No legitimate interest, on the other side, is the employer's desire to
protect him from mere competition by the covenantor. The question if the covenantee
has a legitimate interest cannot be abstractly determined. The employer's interest has to
be determined in every single case.
7.1.1. FREELAN eERS
The civil courts decided in an unbroken line of cases that in cases of freelaneers a
complete prohibition of competition cannot be covered by a legitimate business
interest, and therefore the restraint is void. In such cases, the company can
protect itself by concluding a clause that prohibits dealing with former clients of
the covenantee. It was stated, that such a clause is only used to edge competitors
out of the market. Furthermore, only customers can be protected, with whose was
dealt within the last two or three years.204
7.1.2. SALESMEN
If salesmen change their jobs, the most serious problem is, that they are likely try
to tie their old customers to the new company. In such cases, the company can
protect itself by concluding a clause that prohibits dealing with former clients of
200 MunchKommHGB/G v Hoyningen-Huene § 74a Ro. 31.
201 BAG, AP 15 zu § 133fGewO.
202 BAG, AP 2 zu § 74a HGB.
203 G Schaub ,,Arbeitsrechtliches Handbuch" (2000), ~ 58 III 9, p. 415.
204 G v Hoyningen-Huene op cit § 74 Ro 12; BGH, N"JW1997,3089.
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the covenantee. Mostly, there is no further protectable interest for the
covenantee; and particularly no legitimate business interest to restrain him from
working for a competitor at all.205
7.1.3. WORKERS
Very problematic are restraint clauses with workers that do not have any contact
with clients and suppliers. In such cases the intention of the restraint clause is
only to keep the qualified worker and withhold him from the competitors.ëv Such
an intention is not covered by the restraint rules. Sometimes it is argued that
employers often spend a lot of money by training or specializing their workers,
and that the employers want to protect these expenses. But such expenses can
easily be protected by utilizing obligations of repayment; such expenses cannot
justify a restraint.
7.1.4. BRANCHES WITHOUT TRADE SECRETS
The Federal Labour Court-'? had to decide a case where a driving instructor was
restrained. In this case the court stipulated, that a restraint cannot be justified, if
there are no special trade secrets in a particular branch and no regular customers
are involved. In this case the restraint was only used to edge the driving instructor
out of the market.ë"
7.1.5. LIMITATION ON PARTICULAR COMPETITORS
Sometimes restraints were placed on covenanters, not to work for a particular
competitor, even if there are other equally "dangerous" competitors. Such
restraints are indications that the covenantee is primarily not concerned about his
own company, but rather intends to weaken a competitor. Such an intention is
not covered by sec. 74a(1) sentence 1 Commercial Code. If there are reasonable
grounds to distinguish between competitors, a clause might be reasonable.ê'?
7.1.6. COMPANY-RELATED RESTRAINTS
As seen above, it is possible to draft clauses by USing company-related
formulations. By virtue of sec. 74a(1) sentence 1 Commercial Code it has to be
distinguished if an employer can restrict an employee from working for a
competitor at all, or if he only can restrict him from working in his same
profession or position. The Federal Labour Court-!? stated that the employer
basically can only have a reasonable interest in restricting an employee from a
205 OLG Hanun, GmbHR 1988, 345.
206 BAG, AP 22 ZU!611 BGB.
207 BAG, AP 15 zu 133£GewO.
208 OLG Koln, OL Z 1967,394.
209 BAG, AP 1 zu § 611 BGB.
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particular activity in his job and not at all. The restraint that covers all activities
for a competing company can only be reasonable in cases of members of
executive bodies or executive personnel alone.ê!!
7.1.7. ABSENCEOFCOMPETITORS
By virtue of sec. 74a(1) sentence 1 Commercial Code, the restraint clause is non-
binding if it does not protect a legitimate business interest of the principal. That
requires that the principal has a protectable business interest. The latter is lacking
if the employer shuts down his business and leaves the market, because he cannot
be a subject of competition. In another case the Federal Labour Court212 decided
that an employer has no legitimate business interest if there exist virtually no
competitors in the particular market.
7.1.8. EMPLOYEESGAINEDNOTRADESECRETS
In some cases the problem was, that an employee was restrained because the
employer thought that the employee could gain some business secrets while
working for him. In fact, the employee did not gain any relevant information; e.g.
because the employment relationship was terminated after a very short time or
because of other factual reasons.êl> In such cases the employer has no legitimate
business interest.
7.1.9. INFORMATIONGETSPUBLICLYKNOWN
As mentioned above the employer has a reasonable legitimate business interest if
he wants to protect business secrets. But if such business secrets become
commonly known, of if they are no longer interesting or important for the
employer he has no protectable business interest anymore and therefore the
restraint clause is no longer enforceable.
7.2. SPATIAL BORDERS
Spatial limitations obviously can go only as far as competition or competitors exist. If
cases of mass services are concerned, like taxi drivers or insurance agents, a spatial
restriction has to be drawn very narrowly. If very sophisticated services are concerned the
spatial restriction may be (very) wide. In 1970 the Federal Labour Court-l" considered
whether a spatial restriction for a chemical manager of a plant could be extended over the
210 BAG, AP 2 zu § 74a HGB,
211 BAG, AP 21 zu § 133f c-,o.
212 BAG AP 25 zu § 615 BGB
213 D G~u1,''Wechselbeziehungen zwischen betrieblicher Altersversorgung und Wettbewerbsverbot", BB 1980,59,
214 BAG, AP 24 zu § 133fGewO
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whole European Union,21Sbut did not decide the question. Nowadays this question has to
be clearly answered in the afftrmative.
7.3. TEMPORAL BORDERS
Theoretically it has to be considered, how long a restraint is covered by a legitimate
business interest. However, sec. 74a(1) sentence 3 Commercial Code stipulates a maximal
temporal border of 2 years. Only in isolated cases a shorter temporal border has to be
used, to be reasonable.
8. COMPENSATION
Due to sec. 74(2) Commercial Code, the restraint clause is only binding if the employer is
obligated to pay annual compensation equal to at least one-half of the most recent contractual
remuneration received by the employee. Therefore, it is enough if the employer pays 50% of
the remuneration. However, consideration should be given to payment of a higher
remuneration, if the restraint is wide-ranging.
In the meantime, the principle of "no restraint without compensation" applies completely.
Initially the Commercial Code and the Industrial Code contained different regulations, where
in some cases restraints were permissible although no compensation was paid. Over time the
Federal Labour Court held those provisions as unconstitutional or the legislator repealed
them.216
In practice, many restraints are invalid, because the clauses were clumsily drafted, and do not
match the conditions laid down in sec. 74(2) or 74b Commercial Code. However, in practice
the most complicated topic is the speciftc calculation of the compensation, particularly if the
remuneration consists of variable parts.217
8.1. CALCULATION OF THE COMPENSATION
When the compensation is calculated, only the remuneration of the recent employment
relationship has to be considered; no job on the side218 or former employment
relationships have influence on the compensation.
8.2. CONTRACTUAL REMUNERATION
The stipulated "contractual remuneration" 219consists basically of all payments in money
and kind that the employee gets from his employer. Therefore a company car or
company-owned housing as well as share in proftts, bonuses and gratuity have to be
215 Named in that time: European Community.
216 See IV 3. supra.
217 The presentation of all this problems would lead out of the scope of this thesis, and are therefore not discussed. Cf. JH Bauer/M Diller
"Wettbewerbsverbote" (2002),pp 139 ff.
218 See V 12.2.infra.
219 In German: "vertragsma3ige Leistungen",
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included. One can say that basically everything falls under this expression that is taxed by
the German income tax as benefits inmoney's worth-ê".
8.3. SPECIFIC CALCULATION OF THE COMPENSATION
The calculation of the compensation is extraordinarily complicated. In what follows, only
the basic rules are mentioned. If the compensation is calculated, basically it has to be
distinguished between steady and variable payments. If steady payments are taken as a
basis for calculation, the last month's pay is relevant. If variable elements are concerned,
due to sec. 74b(ii) Commercial Code, the period of 36 months before leaving the
employment is relevant. Only if the employment relationship was shorter than three years,
is this duration applicable.
8.4. NAME AND PURPOSE OF COMPENSATION
To comply with sec. 74(2) Commercial Code you have only to pay the necessary
compensation. It does not matter if the payment is described as "interim payment"221or
"retirement payment".222
8.5. LACK OF STIPULATION OF A SPECIFIC COMPENSATION
In some cases the parties did not stipulate the exact amount that has to be paid as
compensation, but they stipulated that the compensation should be paid "as regulated in
sec. 74(2) and 74b Commercial Code". The Federal Labour Court223decided that such
clause would trigger off a compensation of 50%.
9. CONDITIONAL RESTRAINTS
In many cases restraint clauses are drafted with the intention to be only effective when a
particular condition applies, or if the covenantee chooses to enforce the restraint. Firstly, an
attempt was made to draft clauses, where an employer has an option to choose whether he
wants to enforce the restraint after termination of the employment, or not. Later they tried to
draft the clauses in such a way that the employee has a duty to conclude a restraint agreement
with the employer, if the employer wishes to conclude one. Over time many other opalescent
clauses came up, all with the intention of enforcing (and paying for) the restraint if it is
important to do so, and not enforcing it, if it would become too expensive. However, the
Federal Labour Court over and over held those clauses as non-binding.P"
220 In German: "geldwerter Vorteil".
221 In German: "Ubergangsgels".
222 In German: "Ruhestandsgeld".
223 BAG, AP 35 zu § 74 HGB.
224 Cf. JH Bauer/M Diller .Zulassige und unzuliissige Bedingungen in Wettbewerbsverboten", DB 1997,94 ff.
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10.EMPLOYER'S WAIVER DUE TO SEC. 75A COMMERCIAL CODE
Due to sec. 75a Commercial Code the employer can waive his right of restraining the
employee. If the employer wants to do so he has to give a written waiver to the employee.
Due to this waiver the employee is instantly released from the restraint, but the employer is
still obligated to pay compensation for at least one year after transmitting the waiver. This
provision should enable the employer to get rid of a costly restraint agreement, that has
become no longer interesting for him.225
If or how long the employer has to pay compensation depends on the duration of
employment after submitting the waiver. If the employee works for the employer for more
than a year, after submitting the waiver, the employer has to pay no compensation. If the
waiver is submitted right after termination of the labour relationship, the employer has to pay
for a full year, though. Once the employer has submitted the waiver, the employee is free to
choose a new job, although the employer is obligated to pay compensation for the remaining
period.
The Commercial Code concludes no provision that grants such a right to the employee as
well, and therefore, the employee has no right to rescue himself from a restraint agreement.
However, the parties can conclude an agreement, where they resolve the restraint
agreement.226 For the sake of completeness it has to be mentioned, that in addition such
waivers or agreements cannot be conditional.ê-?
11. INVALIDITY OF THE RESTRAINT CLAUSE DUE TO SEC. 75 COMMERCIAL CODE
Basically restraint clauses become enforceable when the employment relationship ends. The
circumstances concerning the kind of the termination basically do not matter. However, sec.
75 Commercial Code stipulates some exceptions from this rule. Due to sec. 75 Commercial
Code the party that terminates the employment relationship because of a reasonable
extraordinary reason228 has a right to declare that he does not consider himself bound by the
agreement. This is stipulated in sec. 75(1) Commercial Code concerning the employee, and
stipulated in sec. 75(3) Commercial Code concerning the employer. These regulations have
the intention to sanction the breaching party. It is said that the reason for this regulation is
also the fact that there is no more a bond of trust between the parties after one party breaches
the contract in such a serious way.
Different legal consequences are stipulated for cases where the employment relationship is
terminated because of ordinary reasons=", In the case where the employee terminates the
contract he has no right to declare that he does not consider himself bound by the agreement,
225 W Grunsky op cit pp 106 f.
226 BAG BB 1999 1924
227 BGH'Z 79 267' .
228 In Germa~: ,,A;.,nerordentlicher Kundigungsgrund".
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because that is just a typical case where the restraint shall apply.230 If the employer terminates
the contract one has to distinguish between considerable reasons linked with the person.P!
like illness, bad behaviour or other reasons. In all cases, except those linked with the person,
the employee has a right to declare that he does not consider himself bound by the agreement.
It is said that the reason for this provision is the protection of the employee if he is fired
without giving a reason out of his sphere.232
Lastly, it is important to note, that by virtue of sec. 75 Commercial Code, the restraint clause
does not become non-binding automatically, rather the party or the parties have only a right to
untie themselves from the restraint, if they want to do so. If one of the parties declare that he
does not consider himself bound by the agreement the agreement is ineffective instantly and
completely. Therefore ex nunc the employee is not restrained and the employer goes not have
to pay compensation.
12.DEDUCTION OF OTHER EARNINGS
Due to sec. 74c Commercial Code the employee must allow all amounts that he earns through
employment elsewhere to be deducted from the compensation due. Such regulation does not
seem to make sense, because a diligent person would be discriminated against the person, who
does not start working within the restraint-period. But due to equitable principles it is fair to
reduce the compensation paid by the employer.P> Such a deduction is stipulated by the law
and does not need to be part of the restraint clause.P" Also, the employer needs not claim it,
he has a claim ipsojure.
12.1.LIMITS OF DEDUCTION
Sec. 74c(1) Commercial Code distinguishes too limits of income. Basically only income
that is earned elsewhere will be deducted if it exceeds 110% of the former remuneration.
The limit increases to 125% if the employee has to move to another town as result of his
new job. This shall compensate the additional expenditures that were caused by the move
and shall motivate the employee to find another job and be encouraged not live on the
campen sa tion. 235
12.2. KIND OF DEDUCTIBLE INCOME
Due to sec. 74c(1) sentence 1 Commercial Code the employee needs not allow all
amounts that he earns to be deducted from the compensation due. Only those amounts
are considered that are earned through employment elsewhere, or which he maliciously
229 InGerman:"ordentlicheKiindigungsgriinde".
230 HBuchneropcitC 413.
231 InGerman:,;Erheblichein derPersonliegendeGronde".
232 Germanlabourlawknowsonlyparticularreasonsforterminatinganemploymentcontract.Thereforeit distinguishesbetweenreasonslinked
withtheperson,likee.g.illness,orbadbehaviourandeconomicalreasonsoftheemployer,likee.g.decreaseoforders.
2JJ BAG,AP21zu § 74HGB.
234 BAG,AP23zu § 133fGewO.
235 BAG,AP14,17,20zu § 74cHGB.
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fails to earn. Sec. 74c(1) sentence 1 Commercial Code contains all kinds of income. It
includes, for instance, as well payments for being an organ of a company, income by
being a self-employed person or a freelaneer.Ps Furthermore, the Federal Labour Court
created the doctrine of uniformity of calculation and deduction of cornpensation.P?
Therefore all kinds of income that were considered when calculating the remuneration
have also to be considered when calculating the deduction. Insofar as all above-
mentioned kinds of income will also apply here.238
However, if the employee had a side job during the employment relationship and has the
same or a similar side-job during his restraint period, then this income will not be
deducted from the compensation. Otherwise a deduction of these earnings would
disadvantage him.239
12.3. MALICIOUSLY FAILS TO EARN
As already mentioned the employee must allow all amounts that he maliciously fails to
earn to be deducted from the compensation due. Now it has to be determined what is
meant by "maliciously fails to earn". Obviously the covenantor does not have to accept
every job, because he has a constitutional right to choose his job.24o Only if the employee
turns down a job offer without having an objective reason he loses his right of
compensation partly or completely. The extent of the deduction depends on the amount
he maliciously fails to earn. It was decided for instance that it is not malicious if an
employee starts a course at a universityë" or sets up a business.ê'? It is also not malicious
if an employee terminates an employment relationship that he concluded during the
restraint period, because of reasonable grounds.243
The onus of proof that the employee maliciously fails to earn money is on the employer.
He has the onus to prove that there was a particular job, that the employee could have
got, if he had applied for it with reasonable effort.244
12.4. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND OTHER SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
Courts always made clear245 that social security contributions not have to be deducted
from the compensation due. Nevertheless serious discussions arose about the deduction
of unemployment benefits. Due to the wording of sec. 74c Commercial Code
unemployment benefits do not have to be deducted from the compensation due, because
they are no earnings resulting from the covenantor's workforce. Unemployment benefits
236 BAG, AP 6, 7 zu § 74c HGB.
237 BAG, AP 34, 59 zu § 74 HGB: "Grundsatz der Gleichheit von Berechnung und Anrechnng".
238 See V 8. supra.
239 E Heymann/M Henssler op cit § 74c Rn. 7.
240 Art. 12(i) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
241 BAG, AP 4, 5 zu § 74c HGB.
242 BAG, AP 4, 13 zu § 74c HGB.
243 LAG Hamm, 16 Sa 1684/99.
244 BAG, AP 1 zu § 74c HGB.
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usually were paid because the former employee is out of work, and therefore the earning
results not from the person's workforce. However, the Federal Labour Court decided-'"
that the unemployment benefits have the function to substitute-"? a salary, and therefore
have to be included in the system of deductible income. In other words, unemployment
benefits are part of "the amount that he earns through employment", and have to be
deducted from the compensation due.
13.MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE BODIES
It is very controversial, if the sec. 74 ff Commercial Code also applies to members of
executive bodies of companies.ê'" like a managing director or a member of a managing board.
Due to special regulations like sec. 88, 85 and 404 Company Law, members of executive
bodies are restrained from competing with the company during their term of office. After
leaving the company they are by virtue of the law restrained from disclosing business secrets.
But the restraint does not include a prohibition not to compete with the company after he has
left it.249 Therefore companies can also conclude restraint clauses with their members of
executive bodies. In an unbroken line of authorities the Federal Supreme Court-'" held that
members of executive bodies are not employees, and therefore sec. 74 ff Commercial Code
does not apply to them. The court stated also, that the companies can conclude with those
members restraint clauses, being only limited by the rules of sec. 138 Civil Code - contrary to
public policy - and Art. 12(1) Constitution of the Federal Republic Germany - right to choose
an occupation.ê>'
14.0NUS OF PROOF
The rules concerning the onus of proof are very simple. The party that wants to enforce the
restraint or wants to get the compensation has to prove that the parties concluded a restraint
clause. If the employee wants to argue that the restraint is too wide, too vague or void, he has
the onus of proof.252
1S.REsTRAINT OF TRADE CLAUSES AFTER THE 2002 REVISION OF LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
In 2002 the legislator completely revised the whole law of obligations. In this process the
legislator decided among other major changes to apply the law of general terms and
conditions also to "labour law" and therefore also to restraint of trade clauses. In practice this
245BAG AP 46 zu [4 HGB
246BAG: AP 11 zu 74c HGB.
247 In German: HLo ersarzfunkrion".
248IFlatten "Nachveruagliche Wettbewerbsverbote aus Unternehmersichr" (1999), ZIP 1999, 1701, 1705.
24913GH, GmbHR 1991, 15.
250BGHZ 10, 191; 12,8; 49, 31.
251A different opinion is followed by some commentators: Gravenhorst "Rechtliche Grenzen fur die Vereinbarung nachvertraglicher
Wettbewerbsverbote rrut GmbH-Geschiiftsfuhrern" (1999) 62 ff; StaubjW Weber "Handelsgesetzbuch" (1995), vor § 74 Ro. 20ff.
252StaubjW Weber op cit § 74a Ro. 3.
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revision therefore causes some changes to the law of restraints.ê-' But for the purpose of this
dissertation only the application of the law of general terms and conditions will be analysed.
Most labour contracts that were concluded were bought as forms at stationery or were
recurrently printed out by a computer. Therefore in most cases the law of general terms and
conditions applies and causes the application of several additional regulations. Due to sec.
305c(2) Civil Code, for instance, all vagueness occurring in the restraint clause will cause the
clause to be inoperative. Luckily sec. 74 ff Commercial Code are lex special is to sec. 305 ff Civil
Code, with the consequence, that all vagueness problems that are covered by the restraint
rules, only cause the clause to be non-binding. But all other cases of vagueness, that are out of
the range of sec. 74 ff Commercial Code, will probably=+ cause the clause to be inoperative.
Furthermore, until now it was easily possible to include a restraint clause in an employment
contract. If, now, the law of general terms and conditions applies, the restraint clause is likely
to be a surprising clause, if it is not printed in colour or emphasized in another way.255Due to
sec. 305c(1) Civil Code such a clause would then probably-'v also be inoperative.
2~3 Very instructive: Bauer/Diller "Nachvertragsliche Wettbewerbsverbote: Anderungen durch die Schuldrechtsreform, NJW 2002, 1609 ff.
2:14 There are no decisions yet.
255 In German: "Uberraschende Klausel".
256 There are no decisions yet.
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PART V: CONCLUSION
In part I and II the development of the restraint of trade doctrine in England was described. In
part III the modifications of the restraint of trade doctrine in South Africa were shown and part
IV gives an overview of the German restraint of trade rules.
As far as the English and South African part is concerned, the historical developments and
applicable principles of the restraint of trade doctrine were emphasised, to give an explanation
for the restraint of trade law.
By contrast, the main aim in the German part was to g1ve an overview about the codified
restraint of trade rules and to discuss how and why they are applicable to which persons and
entities.
1. SYSTEM OF REASONABLENESS
While comparing the common law doctrine and the German restraint of trade law one can
easily see that two totally different approaches were followed. The common law doctrine is a
"system of reasonableness" and the German one is a "system of compensation".
If you want to restrain somebody in a common law country, you have to ask yourself whether
the restraint will be reasonable infer partes and will not be against public policy (Nordenfelt
test). If this question is answered affirmatively, you will happily be able to restrain somebody
"for free", without being obliged to pay compensation.
Whereas it is much easier in Germany to restrain somebody from working for a competitor,
even if the restraint is not fully covered by reasonable grounds. In such a case if you pay the
compensation stipulated by the law, you are able to restrain this person effectively.
In my opinion, it is conversely a disadvantage not to be able to restrain somebody in
Germany because of a reasonable ground, without paying compensation. It is, for instance,
hard to understand why I have to pay compensation to my former marketing manager in a
post-employment case, just to prevent him from plundering the clients I gained for my
business.
On the other hand, I think it is problematic that I cannot restrain a person in a common law
country from competing with me, in a case where the restraint is not against public policy,
even if I pay compensation to him. I think this is an intense restriction of the principle of
"freedom of trade".
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2. TEMPORAL DIMENSION
When applying the German system, it is hard to understand why I can only restrain a person
for two years maximum, if my reasonable ground lasts much longer that these two years.
However I will not be able to protect these further interests in this case. In England and
South Africa I would be able to restrain somebody as long as it not exceeds the legitimate
interests. A trade connection therefore might be protectable as long as the duration of the
customer relationship with the employer lasts.
Nevertheless, I think the German system is superior in cases where, for instance, customer
connections are involved. Instead of determining how long it will last to tie a customer to a
particular business, to determine the reasonable temporal dimension, it is easier to deal with
an abstract time span of two years, during which time all customers are protected against
competition.
Therefore my sympathy is more on the German side, because German law stipulates clear
rules that probably are not fair in all circumstances, but give the parties certainty and security
about the underlying rules. Basically the parties have to decide on their own, and in advance,
if they have a reasonable ground for a restraint, and how much it is worth to the employer. If
they then conclude a restraint clause, the employee has a right to compensation and the
employer has a right to enforce the restraint of trade clause. At the time of enforcement of
the restraint, there is no space for discussion neither about reasonable and unreasonable
restraints, nor about the range or kind of the restraint.
3. RESTRICTION OF THE ACTIVITIES
In the common law system you have to be very careful how you restrain a person. You can
restrain a covenantor by using a non-solicitation or a non-dealing restraint, or you can just
restrain a person from non-using or non-disclosing trade secrets. If the encroachment is too
intensive the restraint will be unreasonable. The German system also distinguishes between
different kinds of restraints. You can restrain somebody from working in certain functions, or
restrain him from working in a whole branch or for a single competitor. Basically the kind of
the restraint plays a role if the restraint clause is valid, void or non-binding, but the standard is
not applied as strict as it is in common law countries. The restraint clause will only become
non-binding if the restriction is so much too wide, that there is no reasonable ground at all for
such an restraint.
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4. AREA OF RESTRAINT
Concerning the area of the restraint the German system is more practical as well. In common
law countries I have to determine how big the area is, where the sphere of activity and interest
of the covenantee is affected, whereas in the German system only the question arises, if the
spatial restriction is so much too wide, that there is no reasonable ground at all for such an
area restraint.
5. PUBLIC INTEREST
Due to the common law doctrine the restraint must not be against public interest. This was
expressly stipulated in the Nordenfeldt decision, and is therefore also called second leg of the
nordenfeldt test. A similar approach is followed in Germany, where the blanket clause
sec. 138 Civil Code is applicable, with the outcome, that restraint clauses that are against
public policy are void.
6. SUPERIORITY OF ONE SYSTEM
One can see that the two systems have a lot in common, but also differences. Each system is
able to solve the upcoming matters and problems. But nevertheless, both systems can
improve themselves by learning from each other. In the common law system the
compensation should be considered under reasonable aspects, and not only under the topic of
wider reasonable issues that cannot justify a restraint.
The German system should be more serious about the general principle stipulated in sec.
241(2) and 242 Civil Code, that a former employee still has after termination of the
employment relationship collateral duties, that restrain him from harming his former
employer. This principle should be strengthened to prevent competition when reasonable
grounds are involved.
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_ApPENDIX: GERMAN LAw STATUTES:
GRUNDGESETZ DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (GG):
Art. 12(1) GG:
Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, Beruf, Arbeitsplatz
und Ausbildungssratte frei zu wahlen. Die
Berufsaustibung kann durch Gesetz oder auf Grund
eines Gesetzes geregelt werden.
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB):
§ 138(1) BGB [Gute Sit ten]
(1) Ein Rechrsgeschaft, das gegen die guten Sitten
verstoêt, ist nichtig.
§ 241 BGB [Pilichten aus dem Schuldverháltnis]
(1) Kraft des Schuldverhaltnisses ist der Glaubiger
berechtigt, von dem Schuldner eine Leistung zu
fordern. Die Leistung kann auch in einem Unterlassen
bestehen.
(2) Das Schuldverhaltnis kann nach seinem lnhalt jeden
Teil zur Rucksicht auf die Rechte, Rechtsgiiter und
Interessen des anderen Teils verpflichten.
§ 242 BGB [Leis tung nach Treu und Glauben]
Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu
bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rucksicht auf die
Verkehrssitte es erfordern.
HANDELSGESETZBUCH (HGB)257:
§59HGB [Handlungsgehilfe]
Wer in emern Handelsgewerbe zur Leis tung
kaufrnannischer Dienste gegen EntgeIt angestellt ist
(Handlungsgehilfe), hat, soweit nicht besondere
Vereinbarungen tiber die Art und den Urn fang seiner
Dienstleistungen oder tiber die ihm zukommende
Vergiitung getroffen sind, die dem Ortsgebrauch
entsprechenden Dienste zu leisten sowie die dem
Ortsgebrauch entsprechende Vergiitung zu
beanspruchen. In Ermangelung eines Ortsgebrauchs
geiten die den Urnstanden nach angemessenen
Leistungen als vereinbart.
Art. 12(1) GG:
All Germans have the right to freely choose their
occupation, their place of work, and their place of study
or training. The practice of an occupation can be
regulated by or pursuant to a statute.
Sec. 138(1) BGB Good morals
(1) A legal transaction which offends good morals is
void.
Sec. 241 BGB Duties arising out of the obligation
(1) By virtue of the obligation the obligee is entitled to
demand performance from the obligor. Performance
may also consist in refraining from doing something.
(2) An obligation may require each party to have regard
to the other party's rights, legally protected interests and
other interests
Sec. 242 BGB Performance according to good faith
The debtor is bound to effect performance according
to the requirements of good faith, giving consideration
to common usage.
Sec. 59 HGB Clerical employees
One who is employed in a business for the
performance of business services in return for
compensation (clerical employee) shall, unless special
agreements have been made with respect to the type
and scope of his duties or the compensation due,
perform such services as are in accordance with local
custom and have a right to compensation in accordance
with local custom. In the absence of local custom, the
parties will be deemed to have agreed to services
reasonable under the circumstances.
257 English translation by: M Pelzer/EA Voigt "German Commercial Code" (2003).
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§ 60HGB [Gesetzliches Wettbewerbsverbot]
(1) Der Handlungsgehilfe darf ohne Einwilligung des
Prinzipals weder ein Handelsgewerbe betreiben noch in
dem Handelszweig des Prinzipals fur eigene ader
fremde Rechnung Geschafte machen.
(2) Die Einwilligung zum Betrieb eines
Handelsgewerbes gilt als erteilt, wenn dem Prinzipal bei
der Anstellung des Gehilfen bekannt ist, dal3 er das
Gewerbe betreibt, und der Prinzipal die Aufgabe des
Betriebs nicht ausdri.icklich vereinbart.
§ 61 HGB [Verletzung des Wettbewerbs-
verbots]
(1) Verletzt der Handlungsgehilfe die ihm nach § 60
obliegende Verpflichtung, so kann der Prinzipal
Schadensersatz fordern; er kann statt dessen verlangen,
dal3 der Handlungsgehilfe die fur eigene Rechnung
gemachten Geschafte als fur Rechnung des Prinzipals
eingegangen geiten lasse und die aus Gesehaften fur
fremde Rechnung bezagene Vergi.itung herausgebe ader
seinen Anspruch auf die Vergi.itung abtrete.
(2) Die Artspruche verjabren in drei Monaten von dem
Zeitpunkt an, in welch em der Prinzipal Kenritnis von
dem Abschlul3 des Geschafts erlangt; sie verjabren ohne
Rucksicht auf diese Kermtnis in funf Jahren von dem
Abschlu13 des Geschafts an.
§ 74HGB [Vertragliches Wettbwerbsverbot;
bezahlte Karenz]
(1) Eine Vereinbarung zwischen dem Prinzipal und dem
Handlungsgehilfen, die den Gehilfen fur die Zeit nach
Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses in seiner
gewerblichen Tatigkeit beschrankt (Wettbewerbsverbot),
bedarf der Schriftform und der Aushandigung einer
vom Prinzipal unterzeichneten, die vereinbarten
Bestimmungen enthaltenden Urkunde an den Gehilfen.
(2) Das Wettbewerbsverbot ist nur verbindlich, wenn
sich der Prinzipal verpflichtet, fur die Dauer des
Verbots eine Entschadigung zu zahlen, die fur jedes J ahr
des Verbots mindestens die Halfte der von dem
Handlungsgehilfen zuletzt bezagenen vertragsma13igen
Leistungen erreicht.
§ 74a HGB [Unverbindliches oder nichtiges
Verbot]
(1) Das Wettbewerbsverbot ist insoweit unverbindlich,
als es nicht zum Schutz eines berechtigten
geschaftlichen Interesses des Prinzipals dient. Es ist
ferner unverbindlich, soweit es unter Beri.icksichtigung
der gewáhrten Entschadigung nach Ort, Zeit ader
Gegenstand erne unbillige Erschwerung des
Fortkammens des Gehilfen enthalt. Das Verbot kann
nicht auf einen Zeitraum von mehr als zwei J ahren von
der Beendigung des Diensrverhaltnisses an erstreckt
Sec. 60 HGB Statutory prohibition of competition
(1) Without the principal's consent, the clerical
employee may neither carry on a business venture on
his own nor undertake transactions in the field of the
principal's trade, for his own account or that of another
person.
(2) The principal shall be deemed to have consented to
the operation of the business venture if the principal
had knowledge of such business at the time of hiring
the clerical employee and did not expressly agree to the
cessation thereof.
Sec. 61 HGB Violation of prohibition of
competition
(1) Where the clerical employee violates his duty
pursuant to Sec. 60, the principal may assert a claim for
damages; alternatively, he may demand that
transactions made for the clerical employee's own
account be deemed to be made for the principal's
account and that the employee either turn over
compensation received from transactions for the
account of rhird parties or assign his rights to such
compensation.
(2) The statute of limitation for claims is three months
from the time the principal acquires knowledge of the
conclusion of the transaction. Regardless of knowledge,
the period of limitation is five years from the date of
the transaction.
Sec. 74 HGB Contractual prohibition of
competition; paid abstention period
(1) An agreement between the principal and the clerical
employee which limits the clerical employee in his
business activity (prohibition of competition) for the
period following termination of the employment
relationship must be in writing, and a copy of the
document signed by the principal and containing the
agreed conditions must be provided to the clerical
employee.
(2) The prohibition of competition is only binding
where the principal is obligated, for the term of the
prohibition, to pay annual compensation equal to at
least one-half of the most recent contractual
remuneration received by the clerical employee.
Sec. 74a HGB Non-binding or void prohibition of
compensation
(1) The prohibition of competition is non-binding
insofar as it does not serve to protect a legitimate
business interest of the principal. Furthermore, it is
non-binding insofar as, with respect to the
compensation allowed, the place, time or subject
matter, it constitutes an unreasonable interference with
the clerical employee's career. The prohibition cannot
extend beyond a period of two years following the end
of the employment relationship.
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werden.
(2) Das Verbot ist nichtig, wenn der Gehilfe zur Zeit des
Abschlusses minderjahrig ist ader wenn sich der
Prinzipal die Erfullung auf Ehrenwort ader unter
ahnlichen Versicherungen verspreehen Wk Nichtig ist
auch die Vereinbarung, durch die ein Dritter an Stelle
des Gehilfen die Verpflichtung ubernimmt, daf sich der
Gehilfe nach der Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses in
seiner gewerblichen Tatigkeit bescbranken werde.
(3) Unberuhrt bleiben die Vorschriften des § 138 des
Burgerlichen Gesetzbuchs uber die Nichtigkeit von
Rechtsgeschaften, die gegen die guten Sitten verstofsen.
§ 74 b HGB [Zahlung und Berechnung der
Entschadigung]
(1) Die nach § 74 Abs. 2 dem Handlungsgehilfen zu
gewahrende Entschadigung ist am Schluf jedes Monats
zu zahlen.
(2) die dem Gehilfen zustehendenSoweit
vertragsmafsigen Leistungen in einer Provision ader in
anderen wechselnden Beziigen bestehen, sind sie bei der
Berechnung der Entschadigung nach dem Durchschnitt
der letzten drei Jahre in Ansatz zu bringen. Hat die fur
die Bezuge bei der Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses
maBgebende Vertragsbestimmung noch nicht drei Jahre
bestanden, so erfolgt der Ansatz nach dem Durchschnitt
des Zeitraums, fur den die Bestimmung in Kraft war.
(3) Soweit Bezuge zum Ersatz besonderer Auslagen
dienen sollen, die infolge der Diensdeistung cntstehen,
bleiben sie aufier Ansatz.
§ 74c HGB [Anrechnung anderweitigen
Erwerbs]
(1) Der Handlungsgehilfe muil sich auf die fallige
Entschadigung anrechnen lassen, was er wahrend des
Zeitraums, fur den die Entschadigung gezahlt wird,
durch anderweite Verwertung semer Arbeitskraft
erwirbt ader zu erwerben boswillig unterlafit, soweit die
Entschádigung unter Hinzurechnung dieses Betrags den
Betrag der zuletzt von ibm bezagenen vertragsmafiigen
Leistungen um mehr als ein Zehntel ubersteigen wiirde.
Ist der Gehilfe durch das Wettbewerbsverbot
gezwungen worden, seinen Wohnsitz zu verlegen, so
tritt an die Stelle des Betrags von einem Zehntel der
Betrag von einem Viertel. Fur die Dauer der Verbuflung
einer Freiheitsstrafe kann der Gehilfe eine
Entschadigung nicht verlangen.
(2) Der Gehilfe ist verpflichtet, dem Prinzipal auf
Erfordern uber die Hohe seines Erwerbs Auskunft zu
erteilen.
§ 75 HGB [Unwirksamwerden des Wettbe-
werbsverbots I
(1) Lost der Gehilfe das Diensrverhaltnis gemaB den
(2) The prohibition is void, if the clerical employee is a
minor at the time the contract was concluded or if the
principal causes the clerical employee to give his word
of honor or a similar assurance. The agreement by
which a third party, in lieu of the clerical employee,
assumes the obligation ta ensure that the clerical
employee will restrict his professional activity following
the end of the employment relationship, is also void.
(3) The provisions of Sec. 138 of the Civil Code with
regard to the nullity of legal acts contrary to public
policy remain unaffected.
Sec. 74 b HGB Payment and calculation of
compensation
(1) Compensation guaranteed ta the clerical employee
pursuant to Sec. 74 Subsection 2 is to be paid at the
end of every month.
(2) Insofar as the contractual remuneration due the
clerical employee is based upon a commission or other
variable payment, the average of such remuneration
received over the last three years is to he used to
calculate the compensation due the employee. Where
the applicable provision of the contract with respect to
such amounts has not been in force three years at the
end of the employment relationship, the estimate of the
compensation amount is to be made by averaging the
contractual remuneration paid during the period for
which the provision was in force.
(3) Insofar as certain amounts were intended ta
compensate for specific expenses arising in connection
with the employment performance, they are not to be
included in the estimate.
Sec. 74c HGB Deduction of other earnings
(1) The clerical employee must allow all amounts that
he earns through employment elsewhere (or maliciously
fails to earn) during the period for which compensation
is to be paid to be deducted from the compensation
due, insofar as the compensation plus this amount
would exceed by more than ten percent the contractual
remuneration last received by him. Where the clerical
employee has been compelled by the prohibition of
competition to change his residence, the foregoing
amount of ten percent shall be replaced by twenty-five
percent. The clerical employee may not claim
compensation for any period in which he is imprisoned.
(2) The clerical employee is obligated, on demand, to
give Information to the principal concerning the
amount of his earnings.
Sec. 75 HGB Invalidity of the prohibition of
competition
(1) Where the clerical employee terminates the
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Vorschriften der §§ 70 und 71 wegen vertragswidrigen
Verhaltens des Prinzipals auf, so wird das
Wettbewerbsverbot unwirksam, wenn der Gehilfe vor
Ablauf eines Monats nach der Kiindigung schriftlich
erklart, daf er sich an die Vereinbarung nicht gebunden
erachte.
(2) In gleicher Weise wird das Wettbewerbsverbot
unwirksam, wenn der Prinzipal das Diensrverhaltnis
kiindigt, es sei denn, daf fur die Kiindigung ein
erheblicher Anlaf in der Person des Gehilfen vorliegt
oder daf sich der Prinzipal bei der Kiindigung bereit
erklart, wahrend der Dauer der Beschránkung dem
Gehilfen die vollen zuletzt von ihm bezogenen
vertragsmafsigen Leistungen zu gewahren. Im letzteren
Faile finden die Vorschriften des § 74b entsprechende
Anwendung.
(3) Lost der Prinzipal das Dienstverhaltnis gemaB den
Vorschriften der §§ 70 und 72 wegen vertragswidrigen
Verhaltens des Gehilfen auf, so hat der Gehilfe keinen
Anspruch auf die Entschadigung.
§ 75a HGB [Verzicht des Prinzipals auf
Wettbewerbsverbot]
Der Prinzipal kann vor der Beendigung des
Dienstverhaltnisses durch schriftliche Erklarung auf das
Wettbewerbsverbot mit der Wirkung verzichten, daf er
mit dem Ablauf eines Jahres seit der Erklarung von der
Verpflichtung zur Zahlung der Entschadigung frei wird.
§ 75c HGB [Vertragss trafe]
(1) Hat der Handlungsgehilfe fur den Fall, daf er die in
der Vereinbarung iibernommene Verpflichtung nicht
erfiillt, eine Strafe versprochen, so kann der Prinzipal
Anspriiche nur nach MaBgabe der Vorschriften des §
340 des Burgerlichen Gesetzbuchs geitend machen. Die
Vorschriften des Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs liber die
Herabsetzung einer unverhalrnismafsig hohen
Vertragsstrafe bleiben unberiihrt.
(2) Ist die Verbindlichkeit der Vereinbarung nicht davon
abhangig, daf sich der Prinzipal zur Zahlung einer
Entschadigung an den Gehilfen verpflichtet, so kann der
Prinzipal, wenn sich der Gehilfe einer Vertragsstrafe der
in Absatz 1 bezeichneten Art unterworfen hat, nur die
verwirkte Strafe verlangen; der Anspruch auf Erfiillung
oder auf Ersatz eines weiteren Schadens ist
ausgeschlossen.
§ 75d HGB [Abweichende Vereinbarungen]
Auf eine Vereinbarung, durch die von den Vorschriften
der §§ 74 bis 75c zum Nachteil des Handlungsgehilfen
abgewichen wird, kann sich der Prinzipal nicht berufen.
Das gilt auch von Vereinbarungen, die bezwecken, die
gesetzlichen Vorschriften liber das Mindestmaf der
Entschadigung durch Verrechnungen oder auf sonstige
Weise zu umgehen.
employment relationship pursuant to the provisions of
Sec. 70 and 71 because of breach of contract by the
principal, the prohibition of competition will be invalid
if the employee declares in writing within one month
following the termination of employment that he does
not consider himself bound by the agreement.
(2) The prohibition of competition will similarly be
invalid if the principal terminates the employment
relationship, unless a significant cause relating to the
person of the clerical employee exists for the
termination or the principal declares, upon giving
notice, that he will pay to the clerical employee the full
contractual remuneration last earned by him for the
term of the prohibition of competition. In the latter
case the provisions of Sec. 74 b apply analogously.
(3) Where the principal dissolves the employment
relationship pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 70 and
72 due to breach of contract by the clerical employee,
the clerical employee shall have no right to
compensation.
Sec. 75a HGB The principal's waiver of the
prohibition of competition
The principal may effectively wave, by means of a
written statement, the prohibition of competition prior
to expiration of the employment relationship. In such a
case, the principal will, beginning one year after the
date of the declaration, be free of the obligation to pay
compensation.
Sec. 75c HGB Contract penalty
(1) Where the clerical employee is subject to a penalty
in the event of non-fulfillment of his contractual
obligation, the principal can assert claims only pursuant
to the provisions of Sec. 340 of the Civil Code. The
provisions of the Civil Code with regard to reduction
of a disproportionate contractual penalty remain
unaffected.
(2) Where the contractual obligation does not depend
on the principal's obligation to pay compensation to the
clerical employee, the principal can, if the clerical
employee is subject to a contractual penalty of the kind
outlined in Subsection 1, only assert the penalty
forfeited by the employee, the right to specific
performance or compensation for additional damages is
prohibited.
Sec. 75d HGB Deviating agreements
The principal cannot, to the prejudice of the clerical
employee, assert rights, resulting from an agreement
which deviates from the provisions of Sec. 74 through
75c. This also applies to agreements intended, by means
of set-off or other methods, to circumvent legal
provisions concerning the minimum compensation.
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§ 75fHGB [Sperrabrede unter Arbeitgebern]
Irn Falie einer Vereinbarung, durch die sich ein Prinzipal
einem anderen Prinzipal gegeniiber verpflichtet, einen
Handlungsgehilfen, der bei diesem im Dienst ist ader
gewesen ist, nicht ader nur unter bestimmten
Voraussetzungen anzustellen, steht beiden Teilen der
Riicktritt frei. Aus der Vereinbarung findet weder Klage
noch Einrede statt.
§ 90a HGB [Wettbewerbsabrede]
(1) Eine Vereinbarung, die den Handelsvertreter nach
Beendigung des Vertragsverhaltnisses m seiner
gewerblichen Tarigkeit beschrankt (Wettbewerbsabrede),
bedarf der Schriftform und der Aushándigung einer
vom Unternehmer unterzeichneten, die vereinbarten
Bestimmungen enthaltenden Urkunde an den
Handelsvertreter. Die Abrede kann nur fiir langstens
zwei Jahre von der Beendigung des
Vertragsverhaltnisses an getroffen werden; sie darf sich
nur auf den dem Handelsvertreter zugewiesenen Bezirk
ader Kundenkreis und nur auf die Gogenscande
erstrecken, hinsichtlich deren sich der Handelsvertreter
urn die Vermittlung ader den Abschlufl von Gesehaften
fiir den Unternehmer zu bemiihen hat. Der
Unternehmer ist verpflichtet, dem Handelsvertreter fiir
die Dauer der Wettbewerbsbeschrankung eine
angemessene Entschadigung zu zahlen.
(2) Der Unternehmer kann bis zum Ende des
Vertragsverhaltnisses schriftlich auf die
Wettbewerbsbeschrankung mit der Wirkung verzichten,
daf er mit dem Ablauf von sechs Monaten seit der
Erklarung von der Verpflichtung zur Zahlung der
Entschadigung frei wird.
(3) Kiindigt ein Teil das Vertragsverháltnis aus
wichtigem Grund wegen schuldhaften Verhaltens des
anderen Teils, kann er sich durch schriftliche Erklarung
binnen einem Monat nach der Kiindigung von der
Wettbewerbsabrede lossagen.
(4) Abweichende fiir den Handelsvertreter nachteilige
Vereinbarungen kannen nicht getroffen wetden.
Sec. 75f HGB Close-out agreements
In the event of an agreement by which a principal
obligates himself to another principal not to employ a
clerical employee who has been employed by the latter,
or to employ him only under specific conditions, both
parties are free to rescind the agreement. Neither a
cause of action nor a defense is created by the
agreement.
Sec. 90a HGB Agreement prohibiting competition
(1) An agreement by which a commercial agent is
restricted in his commercial activity following
termination of the contractual relationship (agreement
prohibiting competition), must be in writing, and the
document containing the conditions agreed to must be
signed by the principal and delivered to the commercial
agent. The agreement may run for no longer than two
years following the termination of the contractual
relationship. The agreement may cover only the
geographical area or group of customers assigned to the
commercial agent and may only refer to the type of
business in which the commercial agent was
responsible for soliciting transactions. The principal is
obligated to pay reasonable compensation to the
commercial agent for the duration of the prohibition of
competition.
(2) The principal may waive the prohibition of
competition in writing up to the end of the contractual
relationship with the effect that he will be free from the
obligation to pay compensation as of the end of six
months after the date of such declaration.
(3) Where one party terminates the contractual
relationship for an important reason because of
culpable conduct of other party, he may, by a
declaration in writing made within one month after
such termination, declare that he is not bound by the
prohibition of competition.
(4) Agreements deviating from these provisions to the
disadvantage of the commercial agent cannot be made.
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